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This dissertation unpacks the agenda setting process of energy as a policy issue from 2008 to 
2015. It explores how and why hydraulic fracturing emerged and developed as a policy 
alternative in this regard. The agenda setting theory of John Kingdon is applied to guide this 
analysis. Agenda setting examines how problems gain the attention of government so that 
policy alternatives can be examined and identified. Kingdon explained this process through 
three analytical streams: the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream, and 
discussed how their convergence can result in a policy window wherein an issue comes to the 
attention of policy makers and policy alternatives can be developed and decisions can be taken.  
A qualitative research methodology was employed to explore all the events and the 
participation of different actors which led to the identification of hydraulic fracturing as a policy 
alternative. Data was collected through documentary analysis and was analysed using 
qualitative thematic analysis. 
The findings of this study have reflected the agenda setting theory of John Kingdon.  As Kingdon 
has argued, when the three streams are coupled together, it is an appropriate time to address 
the problem and for a policy change. This is applicable in this study: the energy problem was 
recognised, and a suitable policy solution was attached to problem, accompanied with a change 
in the political stream. The window opens when the three streams are coupled together. 
The window opened in 2008 when the energy problem became intense, during the period 
when the country experienced load shedding. This was when the energy problem was 
considered a crisis that demanded attention. Policy entrepreneurs advocating for hydraulic 
fracturing saw the window of opportunity and pushed for their proposals to government 
decision makers. A change in the political stream was also experienced. Important government 
decision makers like the President and other administrators were interested in solving the 
energy crisis and were in support of hydraulic fracturing. They considered hydraulic fracturing 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Hydraulic fracturing was considered as a possible response to the energy crisis in South Africa 
(SA) since 2008 (Tucker and van Tonder 2014). Historically, South Africa has always been 
dependent on coal as a source of electricity with an estimate of 72.1% of energy supply being 
coal-based. The Centre for Development Enterprise (CDE) (2008),reporting on South Africa’s 
electricity crisis in the third week of January 2008,noted that the country’s electricity 
generating ability was reduced by 20 %. By the fourth week, a quarter of state energy entity 
Eskom’s ability was affected. Most places in the country went for days without electricity 
supply. The national grid almost crashed (Goldberg 2015). To prevent a crash, gold and 
platinum mines had to suspend their production for five days. They only resumed production 
after an agreement that they would reduce their electricity consumption by 10 % (CDE 2008). 
The cause of this crisis was reported to be a decrease in the availability of coal to sustain Eskom 
to maintain electricity production and supply (CDE 2008). 
It was during this time that a new term ‘load shedding’ was introduced. Load shedding was a 
strategy employed by Eskom in which electricity would be cut in some places for several hours. 
This strategy severely affected the economy and people’s everyday life (Goldberg 
2015).However, during that period nothing was done about the issue at the core of the 
problem until CDE organised a meeting in which government authorities, business and trade 
union leaders were invited to discuss the causes of the crisis, consequences and what could be 
done (Barker 2008). This was when the country started to pay attention to the crisis. 
While coal is behind 72% of the country’s energy consumption, the extraction of shale gas 
through hydraulic fracturing was considered a feasible source of additional power (Munro 
2015).Hydraulic fracturing, sometimes referred to as fracking, is a technique employed by 
engineers to extract gas from underground. In this process a mixture of water and other 
chemicals are used to pressure and fracture rocks. The pressure forces natural gas to flow back 
to the surface from shale rocks or other types of rock formations (Healy 2012).  Shale gas has 
been argued to be cleaner than coal as it emits less CO2 per mega-watthour than coal (Munro 
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2015). Coal emits too much carbon dioxide leading to air pollution. Therefore, the Department 
of Mineral Resources decided that a cleaner method of power production needed to be 
considered (Bocora 2012). The extraction of shale gas is to be implemented in areas that fall in 
the Karoo basin in South Africa such as Pietermaritzburg and its surroundings, Ulundi, Melnoth, 
Pongola, Newcastle and Vryheid in KwaZulu-Natal, the Free State and the Eastern Cape. It is 
believed that shale gas will produce sufficient oil and gas to bolster the country’s energy needs 
(Tucker andvan Tonder 2014). Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling are technologies that 
have been used in many countries and could be used in South Africa to access theshale gas 
(Cooley and Donnelly, 2012).  
Implementation of hydraulic fracturing had generated a strong controversy across the world. 
Supporters of hydraulic fracturing argue that it is the best option when compared to coal as 
hydraulic fracturing emits less carbon dioxide and is a cleaner source of energy (Kirkland 2010; 
Wang et al. 2014). It could also contribute to an increase in energy reservation, employment 
and economic benefits (Davis and Hoffer 2012). The opponents’ argument is that the chemicals 
employed during its process have the potential of contaminating drinking water which could 
endanger the public’s health. In addition, fracking uses large amount of water. It can also result 
in earthquakes (Davis and Hoffer 2012). Pointing to these effects, countries like United State of 
America, France and South Africa have faced strong opposition from the public (Good 2015). 
Since 2008 when South Africa indicated an interest in hydraulic fracturing, many companies 
such as Bundu Oil and Gas, Shell SA and Falcon Gas and Oil submitted their applications for 
exploration rights (Netshishivhe 2014). However, environmental groups and community 
members have opposed the government decision of going for exploration of the shale gas. They 
were concerned about the environmental impact hydraulic fracturing. They were also 
concerned about the disposal of the mixture of water and chemicals used during this process 
which they argued would contaminate drinking water. It has also been argued that the 
government has decided on hydraulic fracturing without proper public consultations and 
research being conducted. These concerns resulted in greater debates as to whether this 
technology must be implemented or not (Peek, Lewis & Teuling 2014).Hydraulic fracturing had 
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to be suspended as the Minister of Mineral Resource ordered a task team to be formed to 
conduct an impact assessment (du Plessis 2015). 
In 2015 the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act was gazetted in accordance with section 
107 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (the MPRDA). This 
regulation was passed after several regulations were formulated or amended. These 
developments in the legislation were meant to provide for hydraulic fracturing implementation 
in the country as the previous laws had not (Munro 2015). South Africa is considering hydraulic 
fracturing based on experiences in the USA. The USA has been successful in generating enough 
energy for its country and has created numerous employment opportunities (Brady 2011). The 
South African government’s vision is to create millions of jobs by 2020; it is assumed that 
hydraulic fracturing would contribute significantly to this goal while at the same time 
responding to the energy demand (Munro 2015). 
1.2 Research problems and objectives 
This dissertation unpacks the agenda setting process of hydraulic fracturing as a policy 
alternative from the government’s first considerations of fracking in 2008 until 2015. It explores 
how and why hydraulic fracturing emerged and was developed as a policy alternative. The 
agenda setting theory of John Kingdon is applied to guide this analysis. An agenda setting 
process is the process that focuses only on those issues or problems that receive attention at a 
certain time (Kingdon 1995). This process, according to Furlong (2004), helps some problems 
gain the attention of government so that policy alternatives can be examined and identified 
.Kingdon’s agenda setting theory helps in explaining how issues obtain space on the 
government’s agenda and how possible solutions are being developed. He explains this process 
through three streams which are the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political 
stream and discusses how their convergence can result in a policy window wherein an issue 
comes to the attention of policy makers and policy alternatives can be developed and decisions 
made (Kingdon 1995). 
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1.3 Research questions 
The central research questions answered in this dissertation are based on Kingdon’s agenda 
setting theory’s three streams of analysis (problem, policy and political streams). The following 
questions are explored:  
How has energy production emerged as a policy issue in SA?  
How has hydraulic fracturing emerged as a policy alternative in SA? 
What is the problem environment regarding hydraulic fracturing in SA? 
What is the political environment regarding hydraulic fracturing in South Africa? 
What is the potential policy development in the area of hydraulic fracturing?  
1.4 Research methodology and methods 
Qualitative research methodology is employed in this study. This allows a researcher to obtain a 
deeper understanding of social phenomenon (du Plooy-Cilliers, Davis & Bezuidenhout 2014). 
Qualitative research produces data in words not in numbers (Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
Qualitative research attempts to broaden or deepen our understanding of how things came to 
be the way they are in our social world (du Plooy-Cilliers et al. 2014). This method according to 
Neuman (2000) analyses, displays, summarises and interprets words. Therefore, it was found 
appropriate for this study since the main objective of this study was to unpack the agenda 
setting process of hydraulic fracturing as a policy alternative from the government’s first 
considerations. It explores how and why hydraulic fracturing emerged and was developed as a 
policy alternative employing Kingdon's framework of agenda setting. 
1.4.1 Data collection method- Non empirical 
Data for this research was collected through documentary analysis. In documentary analysis, 
data may be collected through analysing primary sources such as letters, policies and reports. It 
also involves analysis of secondary sources which are developed through transcribing or editing 
primary sources (Burgess 1984). Secondary data sources such as journals, articles, government 




The study employed non-probability sampling, specifically purposive sampling strategy. With 
purposive sampling, the sample is drawn based on the elements considered useful and relevant 
for the study (du Plooy-Cilliers et al. 2014). Sources were selected based on the three streams 
of Kingdon’s theory. Sources relevant to the study such as meeting minutes accessible to the 
public, parliamentary proceedings, newspaper articles and speeches, reports from Ministry of 
Mineral resources and other organisations, public opinion data were analysed.  
1.4.3 Data analysis 
Qualitative thematic analysis was employed to analyse data in this research. Thematic analysis 
uses thematic coding and encoding data. Coding is a technique used to establish the 
relationship between data collected and other people’s ideas on a certain topic. Coding allows 
the researcher to analyse data relating it to research questions, objectives and theoretical 
framework (Coffey and Atkinson 1996 cited in Boyatziz 1998). According to Du-Plooy-Cilliers et 
al. (2014), thematic analysis employs deductive coding in which answers to the research 
questions are drawn from the sampled literature. With encoding, data is organised to establish 
and create themes (Boyatzis 1998). 
For this study, themes and codes were deductively developed from the research questions 
which were based on Kingdon’s agenda setting theory.  
1.5 Structure of the research dissertation 
This dissertation has been divided into five chapters. Chapter one has provided the background 
to the study. Chapter Two provides the conceptual and theoretical framework with a discussion 
on public policy, agenda settings and different theories on agenda setting process, including 
that of Kingdon’s agenda setting theory which underpins this study. Chapter Three provides a 
literature review. Chapter Four is about the agenda setting process of hydraulic fracturing in 
South Africa. The final chapter provides discussion and a conclusion to the study. 
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the historical background behind hydraulic fracturing in South Africa. 
It established the factors and events that have led to the consideration of hydraulic fracturing. 
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It then presented the problem statement, aims and objectives of the study and research 
methodology employed. Finally, it has presented the structure for this dissertation. This 
introductory chapter leads to the conceptual framework chapter which discusses in details the 
theory underpinning this research. 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The focus of this research is on the agenda setting process of hydraulic fracturing as a policy 
alternative. Research on agenda setting is focused on establishing both how some issues and 
problems become policy issues and get the attention of the government and its policy makers 
as well as the public, and also on how policy alternatives are developed (Kingdon 1995). This 
chapter will discuss different agenda setting frameworks before focusing on Kingdon’s agenda 
setting theory which guides this study. Kingdon’s agenda setting theory which was tested in the 
United State America is applied in this study in the context of South Africa since it provides an 
analytical tool that provides an explanation of how the process of policy making unfolds and 
how the problem, policy and politics streams, when combined, can build and develop into a 
policy.  This chapter will preface by establishing agenda setting in the field of public policy. 
2.2 Public policy 
There are various definitions of public policy. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) have argued that 
public policy is a subjective matter as different scholars define it based on the influence of their 
experiences and conditions. Most of the definitions that will be outlined here agree on one 
thing: that policy is a course of action. For instance, policy according to Cloete, Wissinkand de 
Coning (2011) is a document declaring what is to be done to solve a particular problem. Policy 
states the activities that are to be done to achieve a certain goal or to improve a particular 
situation (Howlett and Ramesh 2003). Starling (1979) further added to these definitions by 
saying that policy provides guidelines on what is to be done and what is not to be done. 
Baker,Richard & Everett (1975) have defined policy as “a mechanism employed to realize 
societal goals and to allocate resources”. 
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Scholars like Peters (1998, cited in Gerston, 2004) have argued that policy is all government 
initiatives that are implemented to impact on people’s lives; these initiatives can either be 
carried out by the government itself or it can appoint any agency to act on its behalf. Gerston 
(2004) expanded this definition by arguing that public policy is all the decisions and plans to 
which government authorities or decision makers commit themselves.  
However, scholars like Smith (1976, cited in Hill, 1997) argued that policy is not only about what 
is to be done; it can also be about deciding not to take action; what is not to be done. Policy can 
be “about making decisions but also about indecision by the government, party or a ruler” 
(Ndlovu 2010). Other scholar’s definitions differ from the above definitions which all agree that 
policies emanate from the government. Hanekom (1987) argued public policies can stem from 
the public, interest groups like civil societies, media and many other stakeholders outside or 
inside the government. 
Public policy is the outcome of a policy making process and we can only have public policy after 
this process has been accomplished (Theunissen 1998, cited in Venter 1998). This process of 
making a public policy comprises different stages which include policy initiation, design, 
analysis, formulation, analogue and advocacy, implementation and evaluation (Cloete et al. 
2011). The policy cycle is composed of different stages and agenda setting forms part of policy 
cycle. According to Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993), agenda setting is the first stage in the 
policy cycle. In this stage, different possible alternative solutions are explored and one or more 
solutions considered best policy solutions are identified and adopted (Kingdon 1995). 
2.3 Agenda setting 
As noted earlier, an agenda setting analysis is the policy analytical technique that is employed 
in this study. Therefore, it is important to define what it is meant by an agenda. An agenda, 
according to Kingdon (1995), is a list of issues or problems requiring serious consideration at a 
certain period either by government or people outside the government or those affiliated to 
government authorities. Some of the issues or problems on the agenda receive more attention 
than others and some may be rejected (Kingdon 1995). Jones shared these views with Kingdon 
and defined an agenda as those issues that demand public action (1984).  
8 
 
The agenda setting process, it is the process that narrows to only those issues or problems that 
receive attention at a particular time (Kingdon 1995). This process, according to Furlong (2004), 
helps certain problems to gain the attention of government so that policy alternatives can be 
examined and identified. Agenda setting is further defined by Cloete et al. (2011) as a 
deliberate planning stage in which policy issues are established, problems are interpreted and 
more pressing problems are outlined, support for the prioritised problem is organised and 
decision makers are influenced to respond to and solve the problem. In the policy making 
process, the first thing is the establishment of the problem or the issue that may affect society 
or part of it by any stakeholder being affected by the problem or representing those that are 
affected by problem (Cloete et al. 2011). They claimed this is the most important stage in a 
policy making process since it is where more pressing and important policy issues that demand 
serious attention are identified; those that have an effect and power over policy making 
process are determined; and lastly this is when interested stakeholders attempt to influence 
the agenda of policy decision makers (Cloete et al. 2011).  
McCombs (2004) provided a different definition in which he argued that “agenda setting is a 
robust and widespread effect of mass communication, an effect that results from specific 
content of media”. Some definitions of agenda setting are embedded in pluralism; they argue 
that the policy making process is influenced by actions of social groups (Howlett and Ramesh 
1995 cited in Hogwood and Gunn 1984). However regardless of where this process stems from 
or who influences it, all definitions agree that it is the identification and prioritisation of a policy 
issue or problem that requires the government to act and establish a relevant solution. This 
process is crucial since there are many policy problems and issues that government must 
respond to but cannot because of scarcity of resources; agenda setting serves to identify the 
urgent ones (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). 
Kingdon’s theory gives an analytical tool that provides an explanation of how the process of 
policy making unfolds and how the problem, policy and politics streams, when combined, can 
build and achieve a plan (Kingdon 1995). According to Kingdon’s theory, inevitable problems 
pressuring the state to take action, like a crisis or a change in any valuable indicator, may 
influence the agenda. The second influencer of the agenda, according to Kingdon, may be 
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increased knowledge among policy specialists in a specific policy area which may result in 
development of new policy proposals by those specialists based on their accumulated 
knowledge. He argued that the third process that may influence the agenda may be political 
processes which could be change of “national mood, public opinion, election results, changes of 
administration, and turnover in Congress” (Kingdon 1995). 
There are several agenda setting models, however this chapter will only focus on the Policy 
Advocacy Coalition (PAC) Framework, the Punctuated Equilibrium Model and Evolutionary 
Theory and Kingdon’s Agenda Setting Theory. 
2.4 Agenda setting theories 
2.4.1 Sabatier's Policy Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
ACF is a policy process framework established by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith focusing on what 
they call ‘wicked problems’, which include conflicts that may arise among different government 
actors involved on goals and technical aspects (Sabatier 2007). Sabatier’s framework assumes 
that a policy change may be influenced by three factors of which the first is the interaction of 
competing advocacy coalitions within a policy sub-system community. He argued that these 
advocacy coalitions are made of stakeholders from all spheres of government, public and 
private organisations with similar beliefs and policy goals who want to influence government 
authorities for policy change (Sabatier 1991). Among this coalition there are what he 
calledpolicybrokers who are peoplewho are there to resolve conflicts that may arise between 
the coalitions (Sabatier 1991). The second factor is changes external to the subsystem;he 
argued change in a policy may be influenced by external factors like socio-economic 
circumstances. The third factor is the effects of stable systems parameters;he argued that 
institutional structures or constitutional rules can either facilitate or constrain policy change 
and he cited federalism as one likely constraint (Sabatier 1991). 
ACF assumes that policymaking is a complicated process which requires specialised and 
knowledgeable actors in a policy area for them to be influential, especially in more modern 
societies. This specialisation happens in a policy sub-system in which there are many actors 
trying hard to persuade for policy change in a policy sub-system (Sabatier 2007). Among these 
policy actors are legislators, agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers and journalists 
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specialising in a particular policy area, together with judicial officials who regularly get involved 
in a policy sub-system (Sabatier 2007). ACF holds the belief that policy actors have the capacity 
to turn their beliefs into a policy. In addition, scientific and technical information can play a very 
crucial role in influencing policy actors’ beliefs. This framework values the role played by 
participants like university scientists and researchers, policy analysts and consultants in a policy 
process (Sabatier 2007).  
2.4.1.1 Advocacy coalition 
ACF assumes that “stakeholder belief and behaviour are embedded within informal networks 
and that policymaking is structured, in part, by the networks among important policy 
participants” (Sabatier 2007). ACF assumes that policy actors fight to ensure that their shared 
beliefs become policies before their competitors do the same. To succeed, policy participants 
combine their resources, efforts and their expertise to complement each other in coming up 
with more convincing and winning strategies. They mobilise support among those with similar 
beliefs like legislators, interest groups, agency officials, judges, leaders, researchers and 
authorities from all government levels (Sabatier 2007). If these policy participants get involved 
in a “nontrivial degree of coordination” they become an advocacy coalition (Sabatier 2007). 
Sabatier argued that advocacy coalitions, according to ACF, can be beneficial for influencing 
multiple organisations and participants involved in a sub-system which may involve more than 
one advocacy coalition. 
Advocacy coalitions constitute the main theme of ACF and they have been critiqued by many 
researchers, such as Schlagers (1995) who criticised it for not providing convincing proof that 
policy participants sharing policy beliefs can actually partner to form a coalition (Sabatier 2007). 
Other research responded to this criticism by arguing that these coalitions do exist although 
conflicts may arise among them. 
2.4.2 Punctuated equilibrium model 
This model started with the analysis of policy making in America. It emphasises “the interaction 
of political institutions, interest mobilisations, and bounded rational decision making” (Sabatier 
2007). It establishes that the interaction of different institutions with similar interests and 
motives can be beneficial in policy making process. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argued that 
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many governments are faced with many problems and policy solutions,as well as 
responsibilities that demand space on their agendas, and they have been responding by 
interacting with other systems at different levels. They argued that government cannot attend 
all issues and instead share their responsibilities and their political issues by cooperating with 
different sub-systems. These sub-systems maybe focused on a specific interest which they may 
compete with other interests (Sabatier 2007). 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) also argued that within a policy community, conflicts may arise. 
As time passes, new interests emerge, which can be dealt with in different ways within a policy 
community. Groups of specialists may bargain and reach consensus and can be in a position to 
obtain what they need from the political system. On the other hand, policy communities 
experiencing conflicts are more vulnerable and less likely to win in politics. If conflicts persist, 
the nature of policy community may take a different form (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). 
However, according to Baumgartner and Jones (1993), in a policy sector, stability may be 
experienced for a long period which can be followed by the emergence of new public interests, 
media scrutiny and public movements. Public opinion and media can influence government 
authorities’ agenda. At the same time, top officials can influence the agenda by mobilising the 
support of politicians, media and public opinion, thereby resulting in a policy change 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Coalitions of different groups may form a strong force that can 
influence the agenda. The interaction of policy participants aspiring for policy change can result 
in a strong argument which can push for a policy.  
2.4.3 Kingdon’s agenda setting theory 
Kingdon’s theory explains why change occurs and why some problems become more important 
than others. Kingdon argued that there are two factors that influence agenda setting and 
identification of policy options: participants who are actively involved and ways in which some 




Kingdon sheds light on players that participate in the agenda setting process and on those who 
are more crucial than others in the process and on those assumed to be important whoare not 
and how these actors relate to each other in these processes. 
According to Kingdon (2011), agenda items or alternatives can sometimes arise from 
participants from inside or outside the government. Participants from the government may 
include the president, the congress and executives while those outside the government may 
include the media, interest groups, political parties and the public. Change can also be brought 
by election results which may come with new ruling party or new party leaders. Agendas may 
also emanate from any participant outside government which may sometimes be the mobilised 
public concerned about their leaders’ decisions. However, mostly the agenda originates from 
party leaders or parties (Kingdon 2011).   
2.4.3.1.1 Participants inside the government 
 
The administration 
According to Kingdon (2011), administration can be composed of three actors which are the 
president, executive office, appointed politicians in departments and bureaus answering to the 
president or any one of the previously mentioned actors.Administration is sometimes more 
dominant in the policy making process. A decision from administration is usually considered 
important; if the administration decides a problem or an issue deserves to be a priority, many 
other actors are also likely to consider it as a priority. Policy advocates whom their proposals 
manage to get the attention of the administration, are more likely to succeed in fitting their 
agenda in government’s policy agenda list (Kingdon 2011). 
Of the three actors in the administration, the president is argued to be the most important. The 
president can set an agenda on his/her own but the executive branch or the congress or actors 
outside government cannot do this without presidential buy-in. However, the president does 
not have full control over the policy agenda as there may be other factors or events that may 
impact on his/her agenda or other actors’ agenda and which are beyond his/her control 
(Kingdon 2011). Although the president is argued to have dominant power in prioritising issues 
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on the agenda, s/he does not have control in identification and selection of alternatives 
(Kingdon 2011). 
Presidential staff 
The staff in the White House and the executive office answering to the president form another 
component of the administration. Some of the staff members are important presidential 
advisors while others are specialists from different fields who form the executive office 
(Kingdon 2011). According to Kingdon (2011), these presidential advisors are crucial in an 
agenda setting process although they have not always been discussed since most agenda issues 
are transferred to executive sub-sections like departments and bureaus, some are passed 
downward and those most important are addressed by the president or his personal advisors. 
Presidential staff may facilitate or delay the process of alternatives identification. Their role in 
this process is more focused on alternatives while the president has more control in setting the 
agenda (Kingdon 2011). Presidential staff is responsible for ensuring that negotiations between 
responsive stakeholders, such as departments and important interest groups are established, 
which will in turn result in administration proposals and will establish how the administration 
will be involved in bargaining when proposals pass through the legislative process (Kingdon 
2011). 
Political appointees 
The last component is formed by those officials selected by the president in departments and 
bureaus such as cabinet secretaries, bureau heads’ administrations, agencies and many others. 
In a traditional legal theory, political appointees are actually policy makers because they are 
likely to be ordered by the president and other authorities to go on with policy making (Kingdon 
2011). Kingdon argued that these appointees play a very important role in the agenda setting 
process; they may not be the founders of ideas but can help push some of those ideas into 
officialagendas, both within and outside their agencies. Issues or policy proposals within 
executive agencies which have been delayed are likely to be passed if they get the attention of 
a valued political appointee (Kingdon 2011). 
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2.4.3.1.2 Participants outside of government 
These participants, as indicated earlier, include “interest groups, researchers, academics, 
consultants, media, parties other elections related actors and the mass public” (Kingdon 2011). 
But Kingdon argued that the distinction between actors within and outside government is very 
subtle. For instance, interest groups are involved with lobbying that could be done by officials 
from the government; also researchers may have relationships with government officials or 




Interest groups play different roles. Some of their activities may have an impact on the agenda 
while some of their actions may influence or impact on alternatives established by policy 
makers. Their actions can either be positive or negative; they may positively support new 
government initiatives or make it impossible to experience policy change if they do not support 
a new initiative (Kingdon 2011). Interest groups are, however, more active in opposing and 
blocking new issues or alternatives from being considered than in supporting and upholding 
actions.  
Interest groups mostly have a positive influence on the agenda of government. They are 
capable of mobilising enough support and making enough noise to attract the attention of 
government officials and place their issues on the government agenda (Kingdon 2011). 
However, Kingdon argued that interest groups cannot push their agenda on their own into the 
government’s agenda. Many factors need to be in place for an issue or policy alternatives to be 
considered by government officials in addition to the pressure from interest groups. Again, 
interest groups can only succeed in raising their issues but do not have the power to influence 
the debates once the issue is being explored (Kingdon 2011). 
Academics, researchers and consultants 
These participants form a crucial set of actors outside the government in the policy making 
process. They are often referred to and consulted by administration and congressional 
committees to give their opinions and advice on their respective fields (Kingdom 2011). Their 
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importance is mostly experienced in the exploration and development of alternatives rather 
than in raising government agendas. When there is an issue or problem that needs attention, 
politicians invite these experts to develop policy proposals aimed at addressing their concerns. 
Academics are most active and influential in developing alternatives (Kingdon 2011). 
Media  
Mass media is considered to have an impact on agenda settings as it influencesboth public 
opinion and the government agenda. Issues that receive considerable media coverage are more 
likely to influence the thinking of the public and the government (Kingdon 2011). However, the 
media is considered less influential in agenda setting as it focuses on issues for only a short 
period before moving on to other issues which may lessen its impact.The media also tends to 
focus on what government is already doing or what government is aware of. But this does not 
imply that the media is not important as it can work as a “communicator within policy 
community” (Kingdon 2011). Different actors both from within and outside government having 
similar interests may communicate through media. Their ideas may be presented on popular 
radio stations or in newspapers making their fellow colleagues aware of what others are doing 
or are thinking about (Kingdon 2011). Administration also tends to place attention on issues 
that have the attention of mass media more than on issues that are raised on reports or papers. 
Media can also influence the agenda by magnifying already established movements. Again, if 
the media manages to affect public opinion, it is likely that the administration will attend to the 
issues raised by public opinion (Kingdon 2011).Shirky (2011) argued that social media has had 
considerable impact on the government’s agenda since the introduction of the Internet in the 
1990s. He argued that social media connects millions of actors, including civil society, activists, 
citizens and government. Social media promotes public participation since it creates an 
opportunity for different actors to have access to information, public speech and can allow 
them to mobilise for collective action. Through social media, the networked population can 
seek change. 
Public opinion 
According to Kingdon (2011), public opinion can have an important effect on an agenda since 
government officials consider the public’s views to direct their course of action. Public opinion 
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may have either a negative or positive impact but the former is the most noticeable. Public 
opinion tends to play more of a blocking role than one of raising issues. It can also have positive 
effect; public opinion may support and promote government agendas and policy alternatives 
which can be evidenced by public compliance with the policy (Kingdon 2011). 
Public opinion may influence the agenda more than alternatives (Kingdon 2011). If the majority 
of the public shows an interest in a certain issue, it is highly likely that government authorities 
will also consider the issue. But the public does not appear to have much influence on 
alternatives that may be explored by government to address the issue. Kingdon argued that 
policy specialists are the ones that get involved in debates in exploring the best possible 
solutions; the public may not be well skilled and or sufficiently knowledgeable to participate in 
these debates with professionals (Kingdon 2011). 
Mass public opinion can affect the agenda of government, but Kingdon (2011) argued that 
public opinion agenda is more influenced by government officials in the same way as the media 
is. Highly respected officials or experts may raise an issue and the public will follow and make 
the idea more popular. Government officials or the administration may have their own agenda 
or policy proposals;then they need to mobilise public support (Kingdon 2011). 
2.4.3.2 The process of agenda setting 
Kingdon explained agenda setting process using three streams: the problem, policy and political 
streams. He argued that these streams come together at the appropriate time and produce 
public policy. The coupling of these steams happens when what he calls a policy window opens. 
This process is briefly discussed below. 
2.4.3.2.1 Problem stream 
Kingdon (2011: 90) argued that there are many problems that demand to be considered but 
only a few will be considered while others are dismissed. In this stream, he explained how and 
why some problems get to be considered while others lose the attention of decision makers. 
His argument was that some problems may gain the attention because of their indicators, or 
because of a sudden event that triggers the attention of decision makers or because the 
feedback from running programmes calling for intervention. It is also depended on how 
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different actors interpreted issues; some may define some issues as problems while others may 
disagree (Kingdon 2011). 
Indicators  
Government decision makers in most cases get to know about problems because of indicators 
which imply that a problem exists. Government and other non-governmental organisations 
frequently monitor projects and circumstances within their communities so their findings may 
indicate a problem which demands attention (Kingdon 2011). Apart from routine monitoring, 
some indicators can be identified from the findings of researchers or academics on certain 
problems. Decision makers use these findings or indicators to assess the “magnitude of a 
problem and changes in a problem or change in indicators” (Kingdon 2011, 19). 
Policy participants pay much attention to problems that are demonstrable; problems with 
demonstrable indicators showing an agent need to find solutions. However, indicators alone do 
not mean the problem will get onto the agenda of government; what is important is how the 
findings or indicators are interpreted (Kingdon 2011). 
Focusing events, crises and symbols 
Indicators can help some problems gain recognition from government authorities but focusing 
events such as a crisis or disaster that intensify the problem result in more attention (Kingdon 
2011). Focusing events may be powerful depending on the personal experiences of policy 
decision makers and the effect of a powerful emerging symbol (Kingdon 2011). Focusing events 
alone cannot be defined as policy problems; they act as early warning signs that need to be 
accompanied by an indicator demonstrating the magnitude of the problem (Kingdon 2011). 
Feedback 
Government officials may also learn about problems from the feedback they get from 
monitoring and evaluation of operating programmes. They can also get feedbackfrom 
complaints brought by the public about the programme or casework or administrators can 
learn about the problem through their daily administration (Kingdon 2011).  They can use 
feedback to judge if the programme is working according to its design, if it is achieving its 
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anticipated goal, or if there are unexpected results or negative consequences or excessive 
costs. Through feedback, they judge if the problem requires their attention (Kingdon 2011). 
2.4.3.2.2 The policy stream 
Kingdon (2011) referred to this stream as a ‘policy primeval soup’. He argued that in thepolicy 
world there is what he called a community of specialists, which is composed of specialists both 
from inside and outside the government. This includes researchers, congressional staffers, 
people in planning and evaluation offices and budget officers, academics, interest group 
analysts.  These specialists are all interested in policy problems. Within this community, 
specialists develop numerous proposals which they believe they will one day become policies; 
they interact and exchange ideas that can help generate proposals (Kingdon 2011). Within a 
community, fragmentation may be experienced, policy specialists may not have common 
paradigm. When fragmentation occurs, communities may experience instability and conflicts 
which can result in a fragmented policy (Kingdon 2011).  But united communities with similar 
goals and beliefs may produce a strong integrated community resulting in a stable agenda 
(Kingdon 2011). 
In this ‘policy primeval soup’ ideas float, alternatives and proposals are developed. Many 
specialists formulate proposals and alternatives that they hope will one day be selected as 
solutions to existing problems. They exchange and share their ideas with other specialists 
within policy community (Kingdon 2011). Whenspecialists advocate for their proposals, Kingdon 
refers to them as ‘policy entrepreneurs’. Some of the proposals could become famous and 
behonoured for a certain period but vanish within no time, others become prominent and 
survive but may get altered (Kingdon 2011). 
Policy entrepreneurs use different forums to advocate for their proposals. Policy entrepreneurs 
are defined as advocates for proposals or for problems or issues to receive the attention of 
government (Kingdon 2011).  They work hard to mobilize the public and different actors 
including the policy community that is not supporting policy change (Kingdon 2011). Policy 
entrepreneurs aim to ‘soften up’ all the actors to accept new changes and welcome their 
proposals. All their efforts are intended to pave the way to capture the interest of important 
actors long before the opportunity actually opens. This to ensure that when the opportunity 
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arises, important people are fully aware of their proposals and embrace them since 
opportunities often only open up for a short time (Kingdon 2011). 
Policy entrepreneurs may attempt to ‘soften up’ the public. This can be done by providing 
education aimed at changing the public’s thinking and garnering their support (Kingdon 2011). 
There are many ways to educate the public which can be used simultaneously. They may 
introduce their proposals or bills on the Hill and let the public talk and deal with the issue. They 
can also educate through congressional hearings in which they can present their proposals and 
problem in the form of a play (Kingdon 2011). Civil servants and important appointees may also 
soften up the public through making as many speeches as possible on the issue throughout the 
country before the policy is introduced. 
Different proposals and ideas in this stream are presented to government officials. The officials 
and those around them both from inside and outside the government assess, discuss and 
debate the proposals they have. Proposals are judged by government officials in terms of their 
political costs and benefits (Kingdon 2011).  According to Kingdon (2011), for proposals to 
survive they have to meet the criteria of decision makers. They have to be technically feasible 
which means they should clearly outline how they will be implemented. They should be value 
acceptable, that is should meet the values of policy community members. They should also 
anticipate future potential constraints. Their costs should also be practical and they should be 
acceptable to the public and specialists. Proposals that fail to meet these criteria can be 
amended to fit the criteria or be merged with something and then go back into the primeval 
soup (Kingdon 2011). 
2.4.3.2.3 The political stream 
Political spheres may have a considerable effect on the agenda of government. Change in the 
administration or national mood may push some problems onto the agenda while removing 
others. Interest groups can prevent some proposals from being put onto the government 
agenda if they do not support such policy alternatives (Kingdon 2011). Changes in the political 
stream can have a strong impact on the agenda. 
The national mood 
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Kingdon (2011) described change in national mood as a change of public opinion when the 
majority of people in a country share common thinking. Public moods change from time to time 
and this shift affects policy agendas and outcomes. The shift in national mood can be detected 
by government participants, those within and outside of government. When this shift occurs, it 
creates an opportunity for government participants to raise certain issues while preventing 
others from obtaining space on the agenda or removing some from the agenda (Kingdon 2011). 
According to Kingdon (2011), it is inaccurate to think that the national mood emanates only 
from the public mass; it can also come from scholars or the president may discuss his interests 
with the public thereby influencing the public opinion. Similarly, social movements may not 
reflect the ideas of the general public; they may be organised by organisations or some leaders 
who may have an influence on policy. Social movements may have a considerable influence on 
national mood (Kingdon 2011). Government officials and those surrounding them may sense 
the national mood through reading newspapers, listening to the comments of the public during 
meetings, analysing public events covered by media or through representatives of interest 
groups, party activists or individuals who visit their offices. Non-elected officials learn about 
national mood from politicians and the media (Kingdon 2011).  
Shifts in the national mood may influence the agenda or policy in many ways. Public opinion 
may have an effect on the party’s image thereby affecting election results and resulting in a 
new government (Kingdon 2011). The change of climate within a country may enable some 
proposals to flourish and remove others that were prominent from the agenda. Changes in 
national mood can come with a new audience and provide an opportunity for advocates of new 
proposals to push their ideas (Kingdon 2011). 
Organised political forces 
This is the second component of the political stream. According to Kingdon (2011), interest 
groups are still important in this stream as participants within and around government respond 
to their activities. However, within these organised activities, there may be conflicts which 
demand consensus building. Government officials may respond very well if interest groups 
share a similar goal since this may provide an enabling environment for them to act. But if there 
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is no consensus between interest groups, political leaders may try to create a balance between 
those supporting the policy idea and those opposing it. Even if there is no balance between 
groups, government officials may still push the idea onto the agenda (Kingdon 2011). 
Government in the political stream 
The third component of the political stream is the circumstances within the government itself. 
Change of administration within the government comes with new changes in the policy agenda 
and priorities. This is because newly elected officials need to fulfil the promises made during 
their campaigns before being elected into power. This turnover creates an opening for some 
advocates to push their proposals while becoming a constraint to others (Kingdon 2011). Apart 
from turnover, jurisdiction may also impact the agenda. Some issues may not be considered 
simply because “they are defined away by the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries” (Kingdon 
2011). 
2.3.3.2.4 The policy window and coupling of the streams 
A policy window is defined by Kingdon (2011) as a chance for policy advocates to put pressure 
on government decision makers to consider their policy solutions on the problem they feel 
demands attention. Policy advocates prepare their possible solutions and wait for a day when 
those problems they seek to solve become prominent; this is the time when a window opens 
and grants them the opportunity to present their proposals. A window opens when there is a 
change in political stream. Policy entrepreneurs always have their prepared proposals at hand, 
waiting for an opening of the window which can be unpredictable (Kingdon 2011). 
The three streams discussed can couple together at a critical time. At this critical time, a 
problem is identified and a policy alternative to solve the problem is established and presented 
to the policy community, accompanied with a change in a political stream that support the 
problem and a solution.  When the three streams are coupled together, this is the appropriate 
time to address the problem and for policy change (Kingdon 2011). 
The window provides a suitable time for policy entrepreneurs to push for their alternatives. It 
opens for a very short period; therefore, policy entrepreneurs fight to push their proposals onto 
the government agenda since such opportunities do not present themselves more often 
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(Kingdon 2011). When a window opens, some proposals are identified and move onto the 
decision agenda. Proposals on the decision agenda stand a chance for legislation enactment 
(Kingdon 2011). 
According to Kingdon (2011), a window may open for many reasons. It may open when there 
are developments in the political stream or when a new problem has emerged and attracted 
the attention of government authorities and those surrounding them. Change in the political 
stream may be change in the administration or change of the national mood (Kingdon 2011). 
New administration is the greatest key to the opening of the window. It grants some groups 
and other policy actors an opportunity to push for their proposals which they may not have had 
with the preceding administration, while closing doors for other participants (Kingdon 2011). 
The change of any political actor may also open a window. Changes occurring in the political 
stream do not come with specifics of what needs to be done; they only indicate which problems 
call for proposals (Kingdon 2011). A window may also open in those critical times when a 
problem requiring an urgent solution emerges. Focusing events also open the window (Kingdon 
2011). 
A window opens for a short time only and there are reasons why it closes. According to Kingdon 
(2011), it may close because policy actors may assume they have solved the problem either 
through decision making or enactment. It may also close because of the failure of policy actors 
to get appropriate solution so they avoid wasting time on one issue and attend to other 
problems. It may also close when factors that caused its opening such as a crisis have passed 
(Kingdon 2011). Turnover in personnel also results in an opening of the window. Authorities 
come and go changing opportunities as they do so. The failure to find a suitable proposal may 
also be the reason for a policy window’s closure (Kingdon 2011). If a window closes before 
action, it is likely that it will not open for a very long time.  
2.4.3.3 Limitations of Kingdon’s agenda setting theory 
Kingdon’s theory have been criticised by different scholars. Sabatier (1991) argued that Kingdon 
treated “policy analysts and researchers as too apolitical, thus neglecting the role of advocacy 
analysis and putting too much distance between the policy and political stream”. Kingdon has 
been criticised for treating policy analysts and researchers as if they are not political. Sabatier 
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(1991) argued that “if the theory can be expanded, attention must be given to the fact that 
there is an intergovernmental dimension in both policy formulation and implementation”. 
Tiernan and Burke (2002:88) have also argued that Kingdon’s theory “has inevitable limitations 
of models that seek to impose order on dynamic events”. Tiernan and Burke (2002:88) have 
argued that although Kingdon’s theory has limitations, it remains useful and “provides an 
accessible general framework in describing and explaining policy processes and forces at work 
in competition for agenda status”. 
2.5Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the theoretical framework for this study. Different agenda settings 
theory have been discussed with the focus on Kingdon’s agenda setting theory which is the 
theory guiding this particular study. The relationship between agenda setting and public policy 
was explored. It has been argued that public policy is the outcome of policy making process. 
This process is composed of different stages which form a policy cycle. Agenda setting is the 
first stage in the policy cycle. 
Theories examined in this chapter have argued that participants in agenda setting process 
involve actors from both within the government and outside the government. They include of 
government authorities such as the president and ministers, media, interest groups, policy 
entrepreneurs and so on. All these actors have an important impact on the agenda settings. 
Kingdon’s agenda setting theory presented three streams which are the problem stream, policy 
stream and political stream. He argued that for a policy change to be experienced, these 







CHAPTER THREE:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the energy situation in South Africa. It provides an‘energy 
history from apartheid times to the present. It points to Eskom as the state energy entity 
responsible for ensuring energy supply. It outlines the struggle of Eskom to sustainably supply 
the country with electricity by discussing in details the energy crisis in the country. It also 
discusses the impact of energy on development. It further discusses the strategies aimed at 
solving the energy crisis which led to the discussion of hydraulic fracturing a sone of the 
alternatives the country is currently considering. It provides a definition of hydraulic fracturing 
and explores the use of hydraulic fracturing in different countries including South Africa. It 
further explores the debates around hydraulic fracturing. The moratorium on hydraulic 
fracturing is discussed and tracked back to 2011. Finally, the chapter outlines the legislation 
governing hydraulic fracturing in South Africa. 
3.2 Energy in South Africa 
In the 20th century South Africa became the first African country to introduce electric street 
lighting in Kimberley. Around 1886 the country initiated mining in Johannesburg which 
contributed positively to the economic development of the country. It was in this period that 
the first electricity reticulation system was established in Johannesburg which was generated 
through steam engines (Writer 2015). However, steam engines did not generate sufficient 
energy to sustain mining operations. Mining companies retaliated by partnering in the building 
of small power stations that supplemented the existing power. In 1906 small power stations 
were substituted with centralised power stations which were introduced by Victoria Falls Power 
Company (VFP) (Eberhard 2007). VFP generated power from Victoria Falls. 
In 1922 the Electricity Act was passed which led to the establishment of Electricity Supply 
Commission (ESCOM) in 1923. Since then, the country’s power supply has gone through many 
transformations: many giant power stations were built in different provinces including coal 
stations which were built to respond to energy crisis which faced the country in 1960s (Kenny 
2015). In 1987 the country revisited the Electricity Act and the Eskom Act was passed which 
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resulted in the renaming of ESCOM to ESKOM (Writer 2015). Eskom, as a state-owned 
enterprise, has been the dominant actor in the electricity sector ever since. It generates 95% of 
electricity in the country and also has a full control of the national transmission system (Pegel 
2010). 
3.3 Energy sources 
The economy of South Africa is mostly based on the utilisation of energy sourced from fossil 
fuels like coal and other renewable potentials such as hydropower, wind power and solar 
irradiance (Giglmayr 2013). Energy production in South Africa is dominated by coal fired 
stations: in 2006 93% of electricity was produced from coal while 4.2% came from nuclear 
power and the remaining 1.3% from hydropower (Giglmayr 2013). In 2015, coal continued to 
dominate the production; it was estimated that over 92% of electricity in South Africa was 
generated from coal whereas 6% was from nuclear (Kenny 2015).  
3.3.1 Coal 
Coal has been the dominant source of energy in South Africa and it is assumed it will remain 
dominant until 2020 due to the unavailability of alternatives. About 251 million tonnes of coal 
was mined in South Africa in 2009, of which 185 million tonnes was utilised in the country 
(Environmental Economic Accounts 2012). Sixty million tonnes was exported at a value of R31 
billion, while 30 billion tonnes was reserved. The country had approximately 55 billion tonnes of 
coal reservations in 2002. It was predicted that the available coal would sustain the country for 
approximately 200 years.  However, in 2008 the estimates went down to 121 years based on 
the rates of extraction (World Bank 2008). 
Coal used to produce electricity for local industries and households has been considered cheap 
and easy to mine. About 53% of coal is extracted from opencast mining operations (Giglmayr 
2013). Coal has been reliable in previous years since South Africa had massive reservations and 
giant coal fired power stations. A disadvantage of relying on coal is carbon dioxide emissions 
(Environmental Economic Accounts 2012). 
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3.3.2 Crude oil and petroleum products 
South Africa imports oil from Middle Africa from countries such as Nigeria, Egypt, Angola, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Qatar, and Iraq. This is because South 
Africa does not have enough oil reservations. It produces petroleum products by refiningcrude 
oil, extracting liquid fuels and gas from coal and processing natural gas to liquid fuels. 
Petroleum products refer to products like oil, petrol, paraffin, gas, diesel, aviation gasoline and 
liquefied petroleum gas (Environmental Economic Accounts 2012). 
3.3.3 Gas 
South Africa produces a limited amount of natural gas. The little it has is generated off the 
coastofMossel Bay. Sasol also extracts gas from coal and some of it is imported from Namibia 
and Mozambique (Giglmayr 2013). 
3.3.4 Renewable energy 
A renewable energy strategy was developed in 2010. This includes the processing of biomass 
and other natural resources such as wind and solar energy. Biomass includes the burning of logs 
to produce heat. The energy produced from biomass can be used in industries and households 
for purposes of cooking and heating (Environmental Economic Accounts 2012).One of the 
efforts to increase energy supply in the country includes the development of solar equipment 
to generate more power from readily available solar energy. Solar energy is mostly utilised by 
the Department of Water Affairs for pumping water for the rural water provision and sanitation 
programme. South Africa has the capacity to produce approximately 36 217 GWh solar-thermal 
power per year (Adam and Fig 2011). A wind farm started in 2010 in Port Elizabeth managed to 
supply Nelson Mandela Bay by 2012 with 10% of electricity and could supply about 80 000 
households with green energy (Sustainable Energy Africa 2015). 
3.3.5 Nuclear power 
South Africa in 2011 announced its intention to increase nuclear electricity by 9,600 MW. The 
country was already producing 1,844 MV from nuclear at that stage (Adam and Fig 2011). South 
Africa intends to invest in more innovative technology that could increase the country’s 





Figure 1: Eskom energy sources (Kenny 2015, 4) 
3.4 Electricity supply  
The electricity sector is dominated by the state-owned enterprise, Eskom which is responsible 
for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity throughout South Africa (Kenny 
2015). It generates over 95% of South Africa’s electricity. Municipal power stations and other 
independent power producers (IPPS) provide the remaining 5%. Eskom fully assumes the 
responsibility of transmitting electricity from power stations to ‘centres of demand’ and from 
here, Eskom and municipalities equally distribute electricity to final consumers, most of which 
is consumed by industries (Kenny 2015 and Pegel 2010). 
3.5 Energy crisis in South Africa 
The electricity sector has been faced in recent years with the challenge of undersupply 
(Pegel2010). In 1990s Eskom had the capacity to meet the demand but in 1994 when the 
government introduced a mass electrification programme, thousands more households had 
access to electricity and therefore increased the demand. Economic growth and 
industrialisation have also resulted in an increase in energy demand (Pegel 2010). The country 
has been struggling to meet electricity demands which has resulted in blackouts and which has 
severely impacted the economy (Giglmayr 2013).  
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Since 1987 the energy demand has increased by 230% whereas the supply has only increased 
by 190 %. For the period of 2006-2009, over 8000MV capacity was not available (Giglmayr 
2013). 2008 marked the year of energy crisis in South Africa (Joffe 2010). In 2008, Eskom had 
the capacity of close to 40 GW while the demand was about 36GW leaving only a 10% reserve. 
In that year power shortages were experienced across the country which severely affected the 
economy. The impact was estimated around USD 282 million (US Energy Information 
Administration2008). The problem was attributed to government policy which was introduced 
in the late 1990s and poor management (Pegel 2010).   
Policy provided for Eskom to operate like a business in a competitive manner. It did not allow 
Eskom to build new power stations nor did it allow the private sector’s involvement in energy 
supply. By the time it was predicted that the country would need to increase its energy 
generation capacity to meet the demand, it was too late (Joffe 2010). It was predicted in 2010 
that in 15 years’ time the electricity demand would double and to meet the demand, Eskom 
would need R300 billion to extend the power infrastructure in the next decade (Pegel 2010). 
President Jacob Zuma in his State of National Address on 12 February 2015 announced that the 
country was going through energy crisis again (Joffe 2010). 
3.6 South Africa’s strategies to address the energy crisis 
To respond to the crisis, the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME),in partnership with 
Eskom, in 2008 passed a policy named National Response to South Africa’s electricity shortage. 
The intention of the policy was to increase Eskom’s capacity to meet its demand (DME 2008). 
Programmes such as the 19,000 MW generation capacity expansion programme were 
introduced (DME 2008). This included the building of two coal fired power stations and the 
exploration of co-generation and renewable energy options. The policy introduced another 
programme called Power Conservation Programme. The aim of this programme was to 
minimise power demand through “power quota allocations, penalties and incentives” as a 
short-term strategy. For medium term, the strategy was about encouraging consumers to save 
electricity; this was done through advocating for utilisation of solar water heaters and energy 




The country has built three power stations called Kusile, Melupe and Ingula. These stations are 
believed will generate approximately 10 000 megawatts. The country is also employing 
renewable resources; about 3900 megawatts of energy have been generated in 2015 from 
renewable sources. Eskom also established Sere Wind Farm which had generated 100 
megawatts in 2015 (Wild 2015). 
According to Minister Gugile (2015), the government intends to secure 2600 megawatts of 
hydro- electricity capacity from the SADC region. For the long-term energy master plan, the 
government intends to pursue gas, petroleum, nuclear, hydropower and other sources as part 
of the energy mix. The country also intends to explore shale gas in the Karoo region. It further 
initiated the Operation Phakisa Ocean Economic initiative which could produce more energy. 
South Africa also plans to engage in the nuclear building programme which is expected to 
generate 9600 megawatts. South Africa has partnered with Democratic Republic of Congo in 
the Grand Inga Hydro-electrical Project which it is assumed will generate over 48 000 
megawatts of clean hydroelectricity, of which South Africa will acquire above 15 000 megawatts 
(Wild 2015). 
3.7 The relationship between energy and development 
Energy products are considered products like any other products which could be sold. Energy 
could be utilised for fuels or could be diverted into other energy products like petrol. It could 
also be exported to other countries. It could be used in industries to produce non-energy 
products (Environmental Economic Accounts 2012). 
South Africa’s development is influenced and shaped by Eskom’s economies, social and 
environmental footprint (Eskom 2011). It influences development through its electricity sales. It 
also has a considerable effect on the country’s GDP through its operational and capital 
expenditure. It contributed about 3% in 2011 to the economy. Eskom also influences the 
establishment and running of industries by supplying them with electricity and through its 
localisation programme. Eskom has shown its commitment to creating opportunities for South 
Africans to participate in the economic initiatives. About 50% of its total expenditure is 
awarded to Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) supplies. Most importantly, a 
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reliable and sustainable supply of electricity is what drives the economy of South Africa. The 
failure of Eskom to provide electricity may have a negative impact on the country’s economy 
(Energy Research Centre 2004). 
Eskom also has a large impact on the employment sector. It is considered one of the major 
employers and customers of goods and services in the country. It has been identified as both a 
direct and indirect employer. It has more than129 000 employees of which about 40 000 are 
directly employed by Eskom while other are employed by Eskom’s suppliers (Eskom 2011). 
About 516 000 family members benefit from these jobs. Eskom continues to create new 
employment in its new building programmes, manufacturing, construction, business services 
and other industries (Eskom 2011). 
Eskom also has a significant impact on local communities; it is committed to providing job 
opportunities to local communities. It offers training and employment to people in 
communities where construction is taking place. Eskom projects also develop good 
infrastructure like roads, rail, telecommunication, sewage and other infrastructure in local 
communities (Eskom 2011). 
3.8 Hydraulic fracturing 
This section will begin by describing hydraulic fracturing and explaining this technology. It will 
further provide a history of hydraulic fracturing, the experiences of different countries and the 
debates among opponents and proponents of this technology. It will end by focusing on South 
Africa’s journey which has led to the passing of the moratorium on hydraulic fracturing. 
3.8.1 Conceptualizing hydraulic fracturing 
Hydraulic fracturing, sometimes referred to as fracking, is a technique employed by engineers 
to extract gas from underground.  In this process, a mixture of water and other chemicals are 
used to pressure and fracture rocks. The pressure forces natural gas to flow back to the surface 
from shale rocks or other types of rock formations (Healy 2012). This technique involves boring 
vertically into the earth until shale rock containing gas is reached; once the rock has been 
reached the drilling goes horizontally to fracture the rock. When the rock has been fractured, a 
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mixture of water, sand and chemicals is injected into the hole to pressure the gas out of the 
rock to the surface where it is collected (CBNCAfrica 2014; Davis 2012). 
3.8.2 History of hydraulic fracturing 
Hydraulic fracturing was first introduced in the United States. The US implemented a number of 
pilot projects in the early 1970s; in 1977 the country approved the implementation of hydraulic 
fracturing which was to be carried out in the tight sandstone formation (Forbis and Kear 2011). 
Its implementation began in the late 1990s in different places like Colorado, Wyoming, Utah 
and Texas. It raised strong controversy among residents where it was implemented as people 
were concerned about health problems and water and air contamination (Jaspal and Nerlish 
2014). 
3.8.3 Hydraulic fracturing in other countries 
3.8.3.1 United States 
United States, since the introduction of hydraulic fracturing, has moved from importing natural 
gas. It has produced enough energy to satisfy the country’s domestic needs and a surplus to 
export to other countries. Since the US deployed hydraulic fracturing more than a decade ago, 
more than 30 % of natural gas has been produced and is estimated to increase to over 50% in 
2035 (Griffith 2011).  
3.8.3.2 United Kingdom 
The exploration of shale gas was initiated in the United Kingdom (UK) in 2007. Cuadrila 
Resource, the company licensed for exploration, estimated that about 5.6 trillion cubic metres 
of shale gas could be generated from Bowland located under Lancashire. If exploited, it could 
solve Britain’s energy problem and reduce its dependence on imported fuel (Jaspal and Nerlish 
2014). UK started deploying hydraulic fracturing in 2011. Tremors measuring 2.3 on the Richter 
scale were experienced in Blackpool and led to a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing in June 
2011 (Cho 2015). However, in April 2012 the UK government announced the lifting of 
moratorium on hydraulic fracturing which took place in December 2012. 
3.8.3.3 Germany 
In 2010, Germany government tabled its intention to initiate hydraulic fracturing but this was 
very controversial (Griffith 2011). Many people formed antifracking groups and what they 
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called Gegen-Gasbohren. Different initiatives led to the sharing of information about hydraulic 
fracturing and after three months, the majority of people in the area were fighting for its 
moratorium until it could be ensured that fracking was a safe process (Schirrmeiste 2014). 
3.8.3.4 France 
France became the first country to enact a moratorium after facing strong opposition from the 
public environmental groups. France was intending to frack the Paris Basin, considered very 
fertile land by farmers (Weile 2014). The French government angered the public by granting 
drilling permits without prior public consultations and debates. After this incidence, antifracking 
groups pushed hard for enactment of laws that would permit public participation when giving 
out permits for exploration of natural gas. They also expressed their concern regarding the 
chemicals employed during fracking and their likelihood of contaminating underground water 
(Griffith 2011). 
3.9 Debates around hydraulic fracturing 
The implementation of hydraulic fracturing has generated considerable controversy among the 
public, civil society groups and professionals. Countries like United State of America, France and 
South Africa faced strong opposition from the public and because of this, South Africa and 
France had to impose moratoria while more research was being conducted on hydraulic 
fracturing (Good 2015). However, South Africa became the first country to lift its moratorium 
on this policy alternative (Boudet, Clarke, Bugden, Maibach, Roser-Renouf & Leiserowits. 2013). 
3.9.1 Opponents of hydraulic fracturing 
In the US, most environmental groups and some officials were concerned about the effects 
hydraulic fracturing could have on public health (Lewiński 2016). The argument was that the 
chemicals employed during its process have the potential to contaminate drinking water which 
could endanger the public’s health. Apart from this, they were worried that this process uses a 
large amount of water and the US did not have strong policies protecting water. They wanted 
these policies to be amended so that they could provide for hydraulic fracturing process and 
consider the chemicals employed during the process. Anti-fracking groups, the public and local 
governments were concerned by reports on water pollution and the environmental effects 
resulting from hydraulic fracturing process (Davis and Hoffer 2012). 
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South Africa is also experiencing this strong opposition for the same reasons. The main 
concerns are around the large amount of water used which is mixed with dangerous chemicals, 
how this will be disposed and its chances of contaminating the water. Hydraulic fracturing 
would take place in the Karoo of South Africa where the population is dependent on the water 
accessed from the semi-arid Karoo basin. People worry that their scarce water will be 
contaminated (Hedden, Moyer & Rettig 2013). 
South Africa is one of the driest countries (approximately 495 mm rainfall in a year)in the world, 
especially in the Karoo region (less than 100 mm of rainfall annually), which is why water is the 
concern (Lewiński 2016). The US is reported to have utilised about 15 million litres of water for 
each well. Where will South Africa get that amount of water from, since the country is already 
struggling to supply its population with water? About 21% of the population in rural areas does 
not have access to improved water sources. In addition, it is already predicted that the country 
will need to increase its water capacity as the demand will grow due to population growth, 
urbanisation, agriculture and mining industries (Hedden et al. 2013). 
3.9.2 Proponents of hydraulic fracturing 
Supporters of hydraulic fracturing in the US were arguing that it is the best option when 
compared to coal as hydraulic fracturing emits less carbon dioxide. It is argued to be a cleaner 
source of energy (Kirkland 2010; Wang, Chen, Jha & Rogers 2014). Hydraulic fracturing has also 
contributed to an increase in energy reservation, employment and economic benefits in the US 
(Davis and Hoffer 2012). The US is currently the largest generator of natural gas in the world 
and has minimised carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in a short period of time by 12 % since 2007 
(Hedden et al. 2013). 
South Africa assumes it will gain the same benefits from hydraulic fracturing as the US. If the 
shale gas production is effectively managed, it could lead to the achievement of the country’s 
developmental goals. Shale gas production could solve the country’s energy crisis and result in 
a production of more sustainable and readily accessible energy (Wait and Rossouw 2014; 
Hedden et al. 2013). South Africa also considers natural gas to be a cleaner energy alternative 
producer when compared to coal. It is expected that hydraulic fracturing could result in a short-
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term reduction in CO2 emissions in South Africa. Shale gas production could be a large source of 
revenue through taxation from private investors (Hedden et al. 2013). 
South Africa is estimated to have approximately 390tcf (71.1BBOE) of shale gas which could 
completely change the experiences of the country (Fig 2012). South Africa’s consideration of 
hydraulic fracturing was based on and influenced by the National Developmental Plan (NDP). 
The NDP stated that the country will pursue hydraulic fracturing if it is assumed it will bring 
more economic benefits and impact less negatively as compared to depending on coal or 
nuclear power (Hedden et al. 2013). 
3.10 Moratorium on hydraulic fracturing in South Africa 
The government of South Africa, since 2008, has been trying to find laws that would support 
hydraulic fracturing. This is evidenced by the fact that numerous laws have been amended 
several times including the MPRDA and the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 
1998 (NEMA) (du Plessis 2015). People opposing government’s decision to implement hydraulic 
fracturing based their argument on that it would impact negatively on the environment and 
their health and the government did not have strong legislature to protect them(Griffith 2011). 
To address the public’s concerns related to water contamination and environmental impact, the 
Minister of Mineral resources released a moratorium in 2011 on exploration licenses while 
investigations were done on the impact of this process on the environment, drinking water and 
other issues (Hedden et al. 2013; Griffith 2011). The Department of Mineral Resources in 2012 
authorised a task team to explore the possible negative impacts that hydraulic fracturing could 
have on the economy and the environment (du Plessis 2015). The task team established that 
there is a chance that the underground water may be polluted. Another concern was for the 
disposal of contaminated water and the issue of transporting large amount of water for long 
distance was raised (du Plessis 2015). The task team acknowledged that hydraulic fracturing 
could create job opportunities, increase revenue income and reduce the country’s reliance on 
other forms of fossil fuels (du Plessis 2015). 
In August 2012, South Africa lifted the moratorium, making it the first country to reverse this 
(Hedden et al. 2013; Griffith 2011). However, the moratorium was reversed before the public’s 
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concerns had been addressed. The government of South Africa focused its argument on the 
potential benefits of hydraulic fracturing based on the experiences of Europe and the US: 
hydraulic fracturing would increase employment opportunities, energy security and reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions (Fig and Scolvin 2015). 
The Minister of Mineral Resources on 15 October 2013 announced a draft regulation detailing 
the standards and procedures to ensure safety in exploration and exploitation of petroleum. 
The regulation incorporated ideas from the public gained during public participation processes 
related to shale gas production and exploration (du Plessis 2015). The Minister of Mineral 
Resources had to issue a second moratorium on hydraulic fracturing in February 2014 since 
government had not reached an agreement on the issue. To respond to those who were not in 
support of hydraulic fracturing, an interdepartmental task team was established to discuss 
issues related to this process. The Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources in May 2015 
demanded relevant laws and another report on hydraulic fracturing (du Plessis 2015).The 
government announced GN R466 in June 2015 which provides the standards and procedures 
for the onshore exploration and production of petroleum (du Plessis 2015). 
3.11 A legislative framework for energy in South Africa 
South Africa is governed by the rule of law, which is the reason why hydraulic fracturing 
implementation has been delayed while the government has amended and formulated laws to 
govern this technology. Different legislation controlling the risks and environmental impacts 
associated with hydraulic fracturing has been formulated including the legislation providing for 
the use of water. This legislation will be discussed in relation to hydraulic fracturing. 
3.11.1 The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) and the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Amendment Act 49 of 2008 (MPRDAA) 
The exploration and production of natural gas is governed by MPRDA in South Africa. Section 1 
of the Act refers to ‘petroleum’ as “any liquid, solid hydrocarbon or combustible gas existing in 
a natural condition in the earth's crust and includes any such liquid or solid hydrocarbon or 
combustible gas, which gas has in any manner been returned to such natural condition, but 
does not include coal, bituminous shale or other stratified deposits from which oil can be 
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obtained by destructive distillation or gas arising from a marsh or other surface deposit”. 
Therefore, shale gas will also be referred to as petroleum since it is a natural gas. 
 
Chapter Six of the Act provides for the rights, applications and issuing of permits pertaining to 
petroleum resources. Section 70 of the Act authorises the Minister of Mineral Resources to 
nominate a state department or any other agency owned by the state to conduct tasks within 
Chapter Six. In 2004, the agency nominated was Petroleum Agency of South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
(PASA) which was tasked to promote the onshore exploration and production and receive 
applications. 
In Section 79(4), the designated agency is responsible for notifying the applicant if their 
application is granted and it also must consult the affected parties. It also has to produce an 
Environmental Management Programme (EMP) which explains how the environment might be 
impacted and how it will be avoided or handled and how pollution will be handled. 
Environmental impact assessments have to be conducted and only when the Minister is 
satisfied with the EMP report can the exploration rights be granted. These requirements are 
provided in Section 5(4) of the Act. The person granted the right of exploration is expected to 
comply with the requirements of the authorised EMP. However, Section 4(d) of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Amendment Act 49 of 2008 (the MPRDAA) and Section 5(a) 
were introduced to replace Section 5(4).  
Section 5(a) states that: no person may prospect for or remove, mine, conduct technical co-
operation operations, reconnaissance operations, explore for and produce any mineral or 
petroleum or commence with any work incidental thereto on any area without an 
environmental authorisation. The new section grants production right from the day the permit 
is granted. 
3.11.2 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Amendment Bill, 2013 
This Bill was introduced in June 2013. The Bill was introduced to include sections that would 
provide for hydraulic fracturing (Motala 2013). This Bill amended some sections in MPRDA and 
MPRDAA. Section 70 of MPRDA was replaced by Section 45 of Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Amendment Bill in 2013. It transfers power for processing petroleum 
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exploration and production applications from agency or organ of state appointed by the 
minister to regional managers. 
Section 71(a) of MPRDA was replaced by Section 48 of the Bill. It states that the Minister has 
the authority to nominate a state agency that will be responsible for accepting, maintaining and 
assessing geological or geophysical information associating with petroleum submitted in terms 
of Section 88. The appointed entity is to submit to the Minister the information pertaining to 
exploration and production of petroleum. 
Section 52 of the Bill changed Section 78(1) of MPRDA and it states that the entity granted the 
permit, holds the right to seek exploration rights in the area related to the permit. The holder 
therefore no longer has the exploration rights; they have to apply for them. 
Section 79(4)(b) of the MPRDA was replaced by Section 53(f) of the bill; it requires the 
applicant, in terms of Chapter 5 of NEMAA, to apply for environmental approval and provide 
environmental reports. Section 53(e) of this Bill indicates that in cases where the Regional 
Manager approves the application for an exploration right, the applicant must be informed in 
writing of the requirement to apply for a license to utilise water based on the relevant law.  
3.11.3 The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Bill of 2015 
South Africa passed the Regulation for Petroleum Exploration and Production on 3 June 2015 to 
allow hydraulic fracturing to take place. This regulation was developed based on the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) which provides for rights for 
exploration and production of petroleum. It provides for the exploration of gas, especially 
offshore gas. Regulations before June 2015 did not provide for hydraulic fracturing (du Plessis 
2015). Section 107 of the Mineral and Petroleum makes this provision in Section 14 of the 
Interpretation Act, 1957 (Act No. 33 of 1957).  
Section 85 of Chapter Six provides that the aim of these regulations is 
To supplement the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations, so as to 
prescribe standards and practices that must ensure the safe exploration and production 
of petroleum. These Regulations apply to onshore exploration and production operations 
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and must be read with the Act, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Regulations and any other relevant legislation. 
3.11.4 The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) 
This Act provides guidelines for decision makers on issues that may impact the environment. It 
defines the environment “as the surroundings within which humans exist and that are made up 
of (i) the land, water and atmosphere of the earth; (ii) micro-organisms, plant and animal life; 
(iii) any part or combination of (i) and (ii) and the interrelationships among and between them; 
and (iv) the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and conditions of the foregoing 
that influence human health and well-being”. Section 2(4) (a)(vii) of the Act provides that the 
likely negative impact of a developmental projects needs to be assessed before making 
decisions. The principles of this Act require that environment degradation and contamination 
be prevented by all means; if this is impossible this must at least be minimised and the 
environment must be rehabilitated following any damage. Water used must be recycled or 
disposed in a way that will not harm the environment (Section 2(4) (a)(iv) of Act 107 of 1998). 
Section 2(4)(p)of Act 107 of 1998 provides that a polluter is responsible for preventing the 
environmental degradation or pollution or dealing with the consequences of the damage. This 
Act continues to provide implementation management guidelines for environmental 
development projects. 
NEMA was revised in 2008 for the purpose of ensuring that the environmental requirements for 
mining activities in the MPRDA match the ones provided by NEMA. Chapter Five of this Act 
requires that environmental impact assessment (EIA) be done to investigate the possible 
negative effects that may come with the activities and be reported to the Minister of Mineral 
Resources or any authorised authority (Section 24(1) of Act 107 of 1998). 
3.11.5 The National Water Act 36 of 1998 (NWA) 
NWA seeks to protect water resources in the country of South Africa. It provides guidelines for 
preventing or minimising the chances of water contamination or degradation. The Minister of 
Water and Environmental Affairs is required by Section 38 of the NWA to authorise or 
determine the controlled activities. Section 37(2) clarifies Hydraulic Fracturing as a controlled 
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activity which will require the application for a license for using water resources. The license 
will specify the conditions and the purpose for water use. 
The Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs or any authorised authority is directed by 
Section 28(1)(a) and (d) to take action against the holder of the license who does not comply 
with the requirements of the license. A responsible authority for granting licenses has the right 
to do his/her research on the likely impact that may be brought by the proposed project on 
water resources (Section 53(1)). 
Section 28(1) of NEMA gives the companies wanting to conduct hydraulic fracturing, the 
responsibility of taking appropriate action to prevent water contamination or take remedial 
measures in cases where the water has been contaminated.  
Critical analysis of South Africa’s legislation 
The country of South Africa did not have an adequate legal framework providing for hydraulic 
fracturing prior June 2015 when the MPRDA was gazetted. MPRDA with other mentioned 
legislations are aimed at reducing and managing all the negative impacts that could come with 
hydraulic fracturing on the environment. However, the protection of the environment is 
depended on the commitment of the Department of Mineral Resources in ensuring the full 
enforcement of the country’s laws. The South Africa legal framework available is argued by Du 
Plessis (2015) to be robust enough to ensure that hydraulic fracturing does not result in 
unwanted results. 
3.12 Conclusion 
The economy of South Africa is mostly based on the utilisation of energy sourced from fossil 
fuels like coal and other renewable potentials such as hydropower, solar and wind power. 
Energy production in South Africa is dominated by coal fired stations. Coal emits harmful 
carbon dioxide and in addition, relying on coal is becoming risky since it no longer produces 
enough energy to sustain the country. Based on the negative impact of the energy crisis, the 
government produced an Act in 2015 and other Acts discussed above that would allow for 
hydraulic fracturing in South Africa. It is argued the country would benefit by increasing its 
revenue as well as creating employment opportunities, at the same time as improving energy 
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security in the country. Hydraulic fracturing is argued to be a cleaner process compared with 
coal. But it faces considerable opposition since people are concerned about the negative impact 









This chapter tracks the agenda setting process of hydraulic fracturing in South Africa from 2008 
to 2015. It analyses how and why hydraulic fracturing came to be considered as a policy 
alternative to solve the energy crisis in South Africa. The analysis is guided by Kingdon’s agenda 
setting theory. It will be established if the agenda setting process of hydraulic fracturing reflects 
that of Kingdon which is divided into three streams (the problem, policy and political streams). 
In the problem stream, the problem that led to the consideration of hydraulic fracturing as a 
possible policy alternative is examined. In the policy stream, the policy alternatives that existed 
in the policy community and different entrepreneurs’ participation are analysed. The political 
stream analyses all the political events and the roles played by different policy participants that 
led to the consideration of hydraulic fracturing as a possible alternative solution to the energy 
crisis in South Africa. This chapter will conclude by examining the coupling and joining of the 
three streams which Kingdon refers to as a policy window. 
4.2Problem stream 
In this stream, Kingdon (2011) explained how and why some problems get to be considered 
while others lose the attention of decision makers. He argued that some problems are pushed 
by their indicators into the agenda of policy decision makers. Focusing events also attracts the 
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attention of decision makers or the feedback obtained from monitoring reports of existing 
programmes may indicate a problem demanding attention. However, for an issue to be 
considered a problem mostly depends on how different actors interpret it; some actors may 
define some issues as problems while others may disagree (Kingdon 2011). 
4.2.1 Indicator 
Eskom, state-owned entity for energy supply, has been facing difficulties in delivering according 
to its responsibilities, especially from2008 to 2015. The failure of Eskom to sustain its energy 
supply has attracted the attention of people who were being affected by its service provision 
(or lack of) and that of policy decision makers. The decline in Eskom service provision acted as 
an indicator of the persisting problem. Identified indicators are explained below. 
4.2.1.1Decrease in energy production and increase in energy demand 
South Africa started experiencing an energy crisis in2007. Energy supply was disrupted by the 
failure of Eskom to meet its energy demands. The crisis reached its peak in early 2008 
(Rabobank 2008). On 24 January 2008 Eskom publicly declared the energy crisis. The 2008 
energy crisis can be traced back to 1994 which was the end of apartheid regime. The 
democratic government introduced an electrification programme aimed at electrifying the 
whole of South Africa. This programme by 2008 had managed to light more than 70% of 
households (twice the population that had access to electricity in 1994). Economic 
development was another contributing factor to the increase in demand (Pegel 2010).   
On top of increasing energy demand, Eskom’s production capacity had decreased. Its capacity 
was affected by many factors, the first being that Eskom’s production equipment was damaged 
due to inadequate maintenance. They were no longer capable of operating and producing as 
expected (Rabobank 2008; Tau 2008). The second factor was the inability of coal powered 
stations to produce energy as anticipated due to heavy rainfalls which resulted in wetting of 
coal.  In addition, Eskom was running out of coal stock piles. Another reason behind the 
shortfall of Eskom’s supply was that its plants were operating near their maximum capacity 
(Rabobank 2008; Tau 2008). 
 
In 2008 Eskom had the capacity of close to 40 GW while the demand was about 36GW 
reserve of only 10%) (Pegel 2010).  The energy problem continued until 2015. According to 
Mantshantsha (2015), cited in Barker (2015)
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the costs; and it could finally force Eskom to limit its electricity supply to neighbouring countries 
(Visagie 2010). 
4.2.2 Focusing events 
To avoid complete blackouts, Eskom introduced load shedding which is the cutting of electricity 
at a scheduled period indifferent places (Rabobank 2008).  Load shedding was an indicator on 
its own. Load shedding was estimated to have cost the economy ZAR 50 billion (USD 6.6 billion) 
in three months in 2008 (NERSA cited in Modimoeng 2008; Barker 2015). During the first 
quarter of 2008, the economy went down by 4.0% as compared to the previous year which was 
5.8% during the same period.  
The energy crisis also forced some mining companies to shut down for at least a week. To re-
engage in production, they had to volunteer to reduce their energy consumption by 10 % 
(Rabobank 2008). The mining industry had to cut five years’ scheduled investments by between 
ZAR 16 billion and ZAR 25 billion (NERSA cited in Modimoeng 2008). This severely affected 
production as well as the economy (Rabobank 2008). According to Baxter, an economist cited in 
Modimoeng (2008),a 10% energy cut was likely to cost many people their jobs. The mining 
sector alone has approximately one million employees. 
Large companies were also required by Eskom to re-schedule their investment projects until 
the power supply was back on track’ which was likely to be 2012 (Barker 2015). Eskom went as 
far as requesting 38 large industries to initiate a group that would work together to ensure 
capacity savings of up to 20%. Finance director Bongani Nqwababa, promised the affected 
companies that Eskom would be able to supply sufficient energy starting from 2010 according 
to a 25-year supply deal made in 2006. He however indicated that after 2013, an extra 500MW 
would be needed (Barker 2015). It was predicted that energy demand would double in 25 years 
and for Eskom to double the supply would requireZAR1 trillion (Barker 2015). 
The country went dark again in 2014. Load shedding was unexpected during that period since 
Eskom has been engaged in building of new power stations which were supposed to be 
functioning by then (Munshi 2014). The problem was again highlighted by President Zuma in his 
interview with SABC News on 26 March 2015 in which he said that the country had been going 
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through load shedding for a while but new power stations have been built and at least one was 
meant to be operating fully then. This led to the suspension of the Eskom CEO who the 
President was blaming for the energy crisis due to his poor management. 
According to Kingdon (2011), a problem gets recognised if it is clearly observable that a solution 
is required. South Africa’s energy crisis was demonstrable, everyone was aware of and affected 
by load shedding. Kingdon (2011) also argued that policy actors demanding policy change had 
to provide demonstrable indicators that a situation was crucial, providing countable evidence of 
the magnitude of a problem. This applies to the energy situation. The Rabobank (2008) figures 
mentioned above indicate the consequences of load shedding on the economy.  
Kingdon (2011) argued that indicators are important but the way they are interpreted is more 
important. The energy situation was interpreted by important actors as a crisis; this is 
evidenced by the statement of President Zuma in his State of the Nation Address on 12 
February 2015 in which he announced the ongoing energy crisis facing the country (Joffe 2010). 
Kingdon (2011) continued to argue that for a problem to be considered an agent issue requires 
a push of focusing events like a crisis. A problem has to reach a crisis phase before it is attended 
to. This applies to energy situation in South Africa; the energy problem had existed prior to 
2008, it was never considered an urgent problem before 2008 since it had not reached the crisis 
state which resulted in load shedding. Load shedding was a strategy employed when Eskom 
was producing too little to sustain the energy supply to avoid blackouts (Giglmayr 2013). The 
introduction of load shedding indicated a crisis. The energy problem obtained a space on 
government agenda because it became a thread to the country’s economy. During the period 
when load shedding was being implemented, services and goods provision and production had 
to stop. As indicated earlier, an indicator of a problem alone cannot push a problem onto the 
agenda; it needs to be accompanied by focusing events like a crisis, disaster or symbols. 
Similarly, focusing events alone hardly manage to push an agenda but accompany the existing 




According to Kingdon (2011), in this stream policy specialists develop numerous proposals 
which they believe will one day turn into policies. They interact and exchange ideas that can 
help generate proposals. Kingdon (2011) has argued that this stream involves a community of 
specialists both from inside and outside of government. These specialists may include 
researchers, congressional staffers, people in planning and evaluation offices and budget 
officers, academics, interest group analysts. However, within this community, fragmentation 
may be experienced if policy specialists do not have common paradigm. When fragmentation 
occurs, communities may experience instability and conflicts (Kingdon 2011). 
Proposals are judged by government officials in terms of their political costs and benefits. 
According to Kingdon (2011), for proposals to survive they must meet the criteria of decision 
makers. They have to be technically feasible, which means there should be clear outlines as to 
how they will be implemented. They should be value acceptable that is they should be in 
agreement with the values of policy community members. They should also anticipate future 
constraints. Their costs should also be acceptable. Proposals should be acceptable to both the 
public and to specialists. Proposals that fail to meet these criteria can be amended to fit the 
criteria or be merged with something else (Kingdon 2011). 
4.3.1 Energy policy alternatives 
To respond to the crisis, the Department of Minerals and Energy, in partnership with Eskom in 
2008 passed a policy as a national response to South Africa’s electricity shortage. The intention 
of the policy was to increase Eskom’s capacity to meet its demand (DME 2008). Programmes 
such as the 19,000 MW generation capacity expansion programme were introduced and a 
power conservation programme.  
The Department of Energy published a draft Integrated Electricity Resource Plan (IRP) for 2010-
2030 in October 2010. It included estimates of electricity demand, potential energy sources and 
the cost to implement that plan. The IRP also sought to minimise climate change. Electricity 
generation capacity needed to increase to 52 GWh by 2030 (World Nuclear Association 2016). 
In early 2011, the IRP was amended with contributions from public consultations and was 
published in March 2011 by the cabinet. The IRP proposed the country energy generation mix 
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by 2013 would include: “48% coal; 13.4% nuclear; 6.5% hydro, 14.5% other renewables; and 
11% peaking open cycle gas turbine” (World Nuclear Association 2016). Nuclear power was only 
expected to be included from 2023. In December 2008, Eskom made an announcement 
indicating it would delay the building of nuclear plants because of limited funds. 
Three power stations named: Kusile, Melupe and Ingula were built. These stations are believed 
would generate approximately 10 000 megawatts using renewable resources (about 3900 
megawatts of energy had been generated in 2015 from renewable sources) (Gugile 2015). 
South Africa is trying to get away from an over reliance on coal as a source of energy. The 
country seeks to solve the energy crisis with clean strategies, which is why shale gas is part of 
the energy generation strategy the country is considering. The country has been influenced by 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) Kyoto Protocol and 
the 2009 Copenhagen Accord which urges countries to resort to energy production activities 
that emit less carbon (Munro 2015). Nuclear power was considered but was dismissed due to 
its expense and risk. Hydropower and other renewable sources are also alternative sources for 
energy production but due to expense, are difficult to implement on a larger scale (Munro 
2015). 
4.3.2 Hydraulic fracturing as policy alternative 
As indicated earlier, the extraction of natural gas from the shale rock through hydraulic 
fracturing was considered by the Department of Mineral Resources as one of the alternatives 
that would be part of the South Africa’s energy mix to solve the energy crisis while not polluting 
the environment (Motala 2013; Wild 2014).  In 1960 oil companies first discovered shale gas in 
the Karoo but it was only in 2008 when the country was experiencing an energy crisis that the 
first company (Bundu Oil and Gas) showed an interest in applying for the exploration rights for 
the shale gas. However, the application was not approved (Cropley 2014). 
In 2011 different companies including Falcon Oil and Gas, Shell International, and Bundu 
(Sunset Energy) submitted applications to the Petroleum Agency of South Africa (PASA) 
requesting exploration rights for hydraulic fracturing (Motala 2013). These companies wanted 
to establish if hydraulic fracturing was feasible in South Africa and how much shale gas was 
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available for exploitation. They would use their findings to advocate for exploitation rights and 
lobby the government to ensure that hydraulic fracturing became part of a policy from which 
they would benefit if granted the exploitation rights (Motala 2013).  
However, energy production from shale gas is still argued to be not clean. Burning of shale gas 
emits carbon though less when compared to coal. It is also not a renewable source and its 
potential to impact on the environment cannot be ignored (Munro 2015). This is the reason 
why different policy entrepreneurs are against the implementation of hydraulic fracturing. 
Treasure the Karoo Action Group (TKAG) as a group against hydraulic fracturing has argued that 
the government needs to consider energy sources that will not contribute to climate change. 
Climate change must be avoided as it threatens “biodiversity, food security and water supply”. 
They proposed that to solve the energy crisis and economic challenges, the government needs 
to consider renewable sources such as wind, solar and wave sources rather than fossil fuels like 
shale gas which contribute to climate change. TKAG argued that renewable energy sources 
have worked well for many countries and will do for South Africa (TKAG 2011).  
However, the TKAG proposal was regarded as not viable for the present situation (energy and 
economic crisis). It was argued to be a long-term strategy which could not solve the current 
problems (Munro 2015). It was also argued that the TKAG did not have a convincing plan as to 
how their proposal would work, how it would replace the over reliance on coal and how it 
would solve the energy crisis and increase employment without incorporating other sources 
like shale gas production in the energy mix. The failure of TKAG to produce a feasible plan was 
the reason why hydraulic fracturing was considered one of the best policy alternatives to solve 
the energy crisis (Munro 2015). The advocates of hydraulic fracturing presented practical plans 
and were able to lobby or attract the interest of relevant policy decision makers. 
According to Kingdon (2011), different proposals and ideas in this stream are presented to 
government officials. The officials and those around them, both from inside and outside the 
government assess, discuss and debate proposals received. Proposals are judged by 
government officials in terms of their political costs and benefits. Proposals have to be 
technically feasible which means they should clearly outline how they will be implemented. 
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Their costs should also be acceptable. Nuclear power and other renewable sources were 
considered insufficient and expensive. Advocates of renewable sources also had not provided 
feasible strategies while hydraulic fracturing advocates had. The hydraulic fracturing proposal 
was therefore considered as it met the selection criteria of decision makers. 
4.3.3 Opposition from interest groups 
The Department of Mineral Resources was in the process of granting exploration permits when 
the public and environmental interest groups opposed the government decision. A number of 
demonstrators, mobilised by photographer Kian Erikson with the Climate Justice Campaign and 
Earth Life Africa, were seen in Cape Town streets protesting against hydraulic fracturing 
(Maditla and Sapa 2011). This is what Kingdon has referred to as community fragmentation 
which occurs when community specialists have different views.  The Treasure the Karoo Action 
Group (TKAG) was the leading interest group against hydraulic fracturing. This group has 
invested its resources since 2011 in researching and educating the community about hydraulic 
fracturing. They also engaged legal courts to fight the government to prevent hydraulic 
fracturing (Fig 2012).  
TKAG managed had massive support from the community as well as entrepreneurs like Johann 
Rupert and swimmer, Lewis Pugh, legal team and other professionals. Agang SA, a political 
party, also joined anti-fracking movements (Sapa 2014a). The legal team helped to develop a 
legal document responding to the Environmental Management Report produced by Shell (Fig 
2012). The legal team also filed a complaint to the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) 
regarding advertisements made in April 2011 by Shell which were considered ‘unsubstantiated 
and misleading’ regarding hydraulic fracturing (Fig 2012). 
In October 2013, Mineral Resources Minister Susan Shabangu presented a draft of the 
proposed regulation to govern hydraulic fracturing. TKAG and AfriForum argued that the 
regulation was not well informed since there was very little information known concerning the 
benefits and risk associated with the process (Donnelly 2013 and Sapa 2014b): "We will stand 
firm against shale gas mining in South Africa, and we will take legal action if we need to, to [get] 
government to take the right decisions," Kleynhans said, AfriForum’s Head of Environmental 
Affairs. In July 2014 TKAG and AfriForum handed over a letter demanding President Zuma pass 
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a 30 day moratorium on issuing of exploration licenses. They demanded public participation 
before exploration licenses were granted as well as more investigations (Sapa 2014b). 
By 2014, according to Wild (2014), the South African anti-fracking groups were no longer active. 
They stopped opposing the government decision since it had been clear that the government 
was committed to pursuing the exploration regardless of people’s concerns. The government 
wanted to confirm the availability of the estimated 390-trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The 
government’s persistence was based on its commitment to reduce unemployment and increase 
economic development. The anti-fracker initiatives to stop hydraulic fracturing which involved 
legal battles only managed to delay its process, not to stop it. However, in November 2015 
TKAG announced that after public meetings they had regained the momentum to oppose 
fracking. They argued that the public should take every opportunity to voice their concerns in 
hearings linked to Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEA) (Mvubu 2015). 
4.3.4 Government initiatives and advocacy strategies for mobilising support 
Policy entrepreneurs use different forums to advocate for their proposals. They work hard to 
mobilise the public and different actors including the policy community who are not supporting 
policy change. They may do this by providing education aimed at changing the public’s thinking 
to garner their support. They may also introduce their proposals let the public talk about the 
issue. Civil servants and important appointees may also soften up the public through making as 
many speeches as possible on the issue throughout the country before the policy is introduced 
(Kingdon 2011). 
The Department of Mineral Resources was forced by the opposition it received from interest 
groups to pass a moratorium and stop accepting more exploration requests. This was approved 
in April 2011 by the Cabinet (Motala 2013 and Fig 2012). The Department of Mineral Resources 
established a task team to investigate the effects of hydraulic fracturing and do public 
consultations since the opposition was mainly concerned about the environmental effects this 
process could have. According to Mining Minister Susan Shabangu, hydraulic fracturing 
suspension was extended for six months to continue with more public consultation. This was 
after (TKAG) refereed to the Promotion of Access to Information Act to demand access to 
information from the task team which they argued was not open to the public (John 2011). 
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In 2012, the task team, led by Rob Jeffrey who was the managing director of Econometrix, 
concluded its findings on hydraulic fracturing and reported that the shale gas available in the 
Karoo basin was estimated to be the fifth largest globally and would benefit the country if 
exploited. The report indicated that hydraulic fracturing could contribute more than 50% 
cleaner energy than coal (Wild 2014 and Merwe 2014). It could also solve the energy problems 
experienced in South Africa while contributing to the enhancement of the GDP by creating 
employment, calling for new investors and new skills, as well as improving the infrastructure 
(Merwe 2014). In 2012, after the submission of the report from the task team, the Minister of 
Mineral Resources announced the lifting of the moratorium that was passed in 2011 on 
hydraulic fracturing (Motala 2013). The minister announced in September 2012 that public 
participation in fracking issues would be allowed since government policies provide for 
participation in resource mining (Vecchiatto and Blaine 2012). 
The National Planning Commission in its report stated that “shale gas has the potential to 
contribute a very large proportion of South Africa’s energy needs … South Africa will seek to 
develop these resources provided the overall environmental costs and benefits will outweigh 
the costs and benefits associated with South Africa’s dependence on coal [and] nuclear.” 
According to Merwe (2014), exploration of shale gas would best be done through hydraulic 
fracturing only if regulations allow this. The government of South Africa in October 2013 issued 
draft regulations providing for hydraulic fracturing. The director of the Department of Mineral 
Resources announced that the exploration of the shale gas would commence once the final 
regulations were passed. He stated that the final regulations were to be developed based on 
comments received from the public. President Zuma, in the State of the Nation address, also 
said “having evaluated the risks and opportunities, the final [fracking] regulations will be 
released soon and will be followed by the processing and granting of licenses” (Forde, 2014). 
In October 2014, the Department of Mineral Resources announced to the National Council of 
Provinces that it was likely that the regulations for shale gas exploration would be gazetted 
soon followed by granting for exploration licenses probably in July or August 2015. Pursuing the 
shale gas remained feasible since it would only be employed for generating electricity not fuel 
which would be beneficial to the economy (Steyn 2015). 
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In January 2015, President Jacob Zuma sent back the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act Amendment Bill to Parliament. This was after the Democratic Alliance’s 
parliamentary caucus chair issued the president with a petition in which they were argued that 
the passing of the Bill would be unconstitutional since public consultation had been 
unsatisfactory and thus the Bill would be in breach of South Africa’s trade agreements (Steyn 
2015). 
In 2015, the shale gas interdepartmental task team initiated a strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) which they claimed was a science-based assessment. This assessment was 
supposed to be concluded in two years. It was meant to enhance people’s awareness and 
understanding of the dangers and benefits that could come with hydraulic fracturing (Professor 
Bob Scholes cited in Wild 2015). The Departments of Environmental Affairs, Science and 
Technology, Water and Sanitation, and Mineral Resources together in May 2015 released a 
press statement that their interdepartmental task team had found limited information in South 
Africa relating to hydraulic fracturing which would make it difficult to make an informed 
decision. They announced that the exploration would continue while the Department of 
Mineral Resources prepared to release the exploration regulations in a month’s time. The 
interdepartmental task team’s argument was the one that influenced the decision to embark 
on a strategic environmental assessment.  
The former Minister of Finance, Nhlanhla Nene announced in a budget speech that R108-
million has been assigned for shale gas studies (Wild 2015). The SEA’s focal point wouldbe on 
“biodiversity and ecosystems services, water resources (surface and ground water), geophysics, 
economics (including agriculture and tourism), spatial planning, national energy planning, waste 
management, human health, air quality, social fabric, visual, heritage resources and sense of 
place” (Wild 2015). According to Professor Bob Scholes, cited in Wild (2015) the investigation 
would be “open for scrutiny by any stakeholder” and he hoped that the government would 
incorporate the stakeholders’ comments. The departments in their media briefing stated that a 
custodian group would be established to monitor the government initiatives including ensuring 
that different stakeholders from outside government and the three spheres of government 
were involved in the processes. 
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The decision to suspend hydraulic fracturing as investigations were carried out and its lifting 
reflects Kingdon’s argument that proposals meeting the criteria of decision makers get 
considered and are altered where necessary to meet the selection criteria. The task team was 
appointed so that their findings could be used to improve the proposed hydraulic fracturing 
process or terminate it, if necessary. The results produced by the task team indicated the 
potential benefits for South Africa from hydraulic fracturing; it also outlined what needed to be 
done and the anticipated future constraints. Based on Kingdon’s argument, it is understandable 
why hydraulic fracturing was reconsidered by the government, considering the potential 
benefits. However, Kingdon argued that proposals should also be acceptable to the mass public 
and specialists which was not the case with hydraulic fracturing; the majority of the population, 
especially those residing in the Karoo, never accepted it. The Karoo residents argued that 
although the government considered hydraulic fracturing as an “once-in-a-lifetime” 
development, its negative impact on the environment cannot be denied (Forde 2013; Wild 
2015). 
All these statements by important authorities indicate that hydraulic fracturing is likely to 
happen in South Africa. Most of the authorities’ statements mentioned the benefits of 
hydraulic fracturing for the country. According to Kingdon (2011), policy entrepreneurs may use 
different forums to advocate for their proposals. Civil servants and important appointees may 
also attempt to soften up the public through making as many speeches as possible on the issue 
throughout the country before the policy is introduced. Kingdon (2011) also argued that policy 
entrepreneurs may introduce their proposals or bills and encourage the public to talk and deal 
with the issue. This is what happened in hydraulic fracturing policy development. The draft 
regulation was passed in 2013 and people were given the opportunity to discuss and give their 
views on hydraulic fracturing which were to be incorporated in the final legislation. Also, 
announcements made on numerous occasions by high profile authorities about this policy 
alternative were designed to soften up the public. 
53 
 
4.3.5 Community meetings 
Kingdon (2011) argued that policy advocates may attempt to soften up the public through 
providing education, which they can do through congressional hearings in which they can 
present their proposals and problems and let the public be involved in discussions. 
The advocates of hydraulic fracturing, including oil companies and government authorities, 
have tried to influence the public to accept it by indicating that the technology that will be 
employed has been proven to be safe and well grounded (Fig 2012). They pointed to the 
economic benefits, the notion that hydraulic fracturing emits less carbon and would solve the 
energy crisis. Shell argued that hydraulic fracturing could produce 700 000 jobs for South 
Africans (Burkhardt 2013; Forde 2013). Shell also assured people that it would not touch water 
from the Karoo since people were concerned that the Karoo is already a dry area. Shell also 
consulted the community and disclosed the harmful chemicals that would be used to a 
committee made of representatives from interested groups (Fig 2012; Maditla and Sapa 2011).  
Since the lifting of the moratorium, a number of prospectors have submitted their applications 
for exploration rights of the Karoo. Royal Dutch Shell was one of the applicants who was 
prepared to spend more than R1 billion on the exploration of the shale on behalf of the 
government. It announced that the exploration would take approximately two years. After the 
exploration, if there is something worth extracting, an Environmental Impact Assessment would 
be carried out. Hydraulic fracturing would only commence after the completion of the 
assessment and Shell would be considered by government when granting the permits to 
implement hydraulic fracturing (Forde 2013). 
Shell have been ensuring public participation through holding public meetings and going house 
to house talking about the hydraulic fracturing process in the Karoo region (Golder Associates 
2011). People were allowed to voice their concerns in those meetings; some did it in writing, 
through emails, fax, post, and telephonically (Golder Associates 2011). Some of people’s 
concerns centred on the lack of water in the Karoo, how fracking would affect their livelihoods 
including that of farmers, cultural value, water and air pollution, and the ecosystem. In 
response to people’s concerns, Shell promised to consult with experts for clarity. Some people 
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in the meetings were hopeful that fracking would increase job opportunities and contribute to 
their community development (Shell 2015). 
Falcon Oil and Gas also had public meetings as part of enhancing public participation. One of 
the meetings in February 2012, in which they announced their interest in exploring the Karoo, 
did not go well. People residing in the Karoo made it clear that they do not want fracking in 
their Karoo (du Toit 2015). 
Bundu Oil and Gas also participated in public meetings. People who attended a meeting in 
February 2015 argued that they would not allow fracking since it would not provide 
employment to the majority of the local residents (du Toit 2015). They argued that the 
exploration phase would employ experts not community members. Some remained hopeful 
that fracking would benefit them by developing their communities and creating jobs for the 
poor (Botha and Yelland 2012). 
The government also surprised the public by holding a public meeting for the first time with 
different stakeholders which they referred to as public consultation. It took the government six 
years to consider and carry out this public consultation. The meeting took place in the Eastern 
Cape and most people were not impressed as only twelve people were given the opportunity to 
raise their questions and concerns and none of their questions were answered by the 
politicians who were present at the meeting. They argued that the consultation was not 
genuine since the ANC government had already made a decision to continue with fracking (du 
Toit 2014). 
4.4Political stream 
As indicated in Chapter Two, political spheres may have an effect on the agenda of the 
government. Change in the administration or national mood may push some problems onto the 
agenda and remove others. Interest groups can also prevent some proposals from being put on 
government agenda if they do not support such policy alternatives (Kingdon 2011). Kingdon 
argued that changes in the political stream have a strong impact on the agenda. 
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4.4.1 National mood 
According to Kingdon (2011), a shift of the national mood may influence the agenda or policy in 
many ways. The change of the climate within a country may enable some proposals to flourish 
and remove others from the agenda. A change in national mood can come with a new audience 
and the opportunity for advocates of new proposals to push forward their ideas. According to 
Kingdon, the national mood may emanate either from the public or from scholars or the 
president who may discuss his interests with the public thereby influencing the public opinion. 
4.4.1.1 National mood - Government side 
The government of South Africa since 2008, through the Department of Mineral Resources and 
the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs, has tried to amend a number of pieces of 
legislation including the MPRDA and the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
(NEMA). The purpose for the amendments was to establish one environmental system that 
would provide for hydraulic fracturing (du Plessis 2015). In 2011, the Minister of Minerals 
announced the government intention to grant permits for shale gas exploration. During that 
period, different companies including Falcon Oil and Gas, Shell International, and Bundu 
(Sunset Energy) submitted their applications for exploration rights. However, they faced strong 
opposition from the public which was against the granting of these permits (Motala 2013). As 
Kingdon (2011) has argued, a change in a national mood creates an opportunity for government 
participants to raise some issues on the agenda while preventing or removing others. In a case 
of hydraulic fracturing despite the interest of government officials on this process, the national 
mood (public opposition) forced the government to suspend the issuing of the shale gas 
exploration permits. Mining Minister Susan Shabangu had to pass a moratorium on this process 
in 2011 while a task team was established in 2012 to conduct an investigation on hydraulic 
fracturing (John 2012; du Plessis 2015). 
In 2012, after the publication of the task team report, the government announced the lifting of 
the moratorium (Motala 2013). Since then, the government has indicated its intention to 
exploit shale gas for the purpose of increasing energy security and job creation (Parker 2013). 
Since the government has considered hydraulic fracturing, it has received considerable support 
from government officials (du Plessis 2015). As Kingdon has argued, the public and other 
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stakeholders outside of government can learn about national mood from politicians and the 
media. This has been experienced in the case of fracking; government ministers including the 
president and other important officials have made statements indicating support on different 
occasions, for example, “We cannot allow a blessing to lie fallow ... If shale gas is one of the 
blessings, we are going to go for it” (Peter quoted by Sapa 2012). The former Deputy President, 
Kgalema Motlanthe also stated on 21 August 2013 in parliament that going for shale gas would 
be a “game changer” for the economy of South Africa. 
The Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr Rob Davies announced the government intention to 
start the shale gas exploration before the 2014 elections (du Plessis 2015). Minister Rob Davies 
also announced on 22 August in parliament that the exploration regulations would be published 
before April 2014 (Burkhardt 2013). Molewa, Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, 
commented soon after, “I'm not saying I want this personally. I want what’s best for our 
country, including in the water sector [and] the protection of our environment” (Parker 2013). 
Chief Director of regulations at the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs, Deborah 
Mochotlhi also said “I'm not saying we're going for fracking. That’s a political decision to make. 
If we go that route we will do everything in our power as water resource managers to ensure 
that we prevent, mitigate and manage those impacts” (Parker 2013). The Democratic Alliance 
spokesperson, Marti Wenger also pointed to the benefits fracking could bring especially its 
potential to create job opportunities for South Africans: “we need to do what is right for the 
environment and we need to do what is right for unemployed people who could benefit from 
fracking” (Parker 2013). 
 The officials in the Mineral Resources department also made various announcements on the 
shale gas exploration in 2014 which were followed by President Jacob Zuma’s speech in his 
State of the Nation address in which he claimed going for shale gas would be a “game changer” 
for the economy of South Africa. He said in parliament, “Having evaluated the risks and 
opportunities, the final regulations will be released soon, and will be followed by the processing 
and granting of licenses” (Forde 2014). 
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President Jacob Zuma also presented the government’s commitment to shale gas to senior 
South African and Malaysian officials in Durban in 2014. He stated that the government’s 
intention is to drill 30 exploration wells in the next ten years, claiming that “over the next 
20 years, this could lead to the production of 300 000 barrels of oil and gas per day.” He said 
nine-billion barrels of crude oil could provide South Africa with oil for 40 years, “while gas 
deposits could amount to as much as 11-billion barrels of oil equivalent, equal to 375 years of 
consumption” (Cropley 2014). Mineral Resources minister, Susan Shabangu repeatedly 
indicated government’s commitment to shale-gas exploration (Wild 2014). 
4.4.1.1.2 Legislation development 
The ongoing amendments and developments of legislation were also an indication of the 
government’s strong support for hydraulic fracturing (du Plessis 2015; Motala 2013). The draft 
regulation for Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation, prescribing “standards and practices that 
would ensure safe exploration and exploitations of petroleum” applicable to onshore and 
offshore operations was passed by the Minister of Mineral Resources on 15 October 2013. This 
draft regulation was passed to allow different views and comments be made by all 
stakeholders. It provides for natural gas, coal-bed methane and shale gas. This draft was 
developed based on comments from the public participation processes (du Plessis 2015). 
The Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs’ effort to ensure hydraulic fracturing has also 
resulted in the publishing of the ‘Proposed Declaration for the Exploration for and Production 
of Onshore Unconventional Oil or Gas Resources or Any Activities related thereto including but 
not limited to Hydraulic Fracturing as a Controlled Activity’ (Motala 2013). The rationale behind 
thisregulation was to ensure that the companies intending to explore the shale gas would be 
boundto apply for licenses for use of water. 
In February 2014, another moratorium was passed by the Minister of Mineral Resources 
following differences on opinions that existed on hydraulic fracturing between the cabinet 
ministers. The interdepartmental task team was established to address the concerns of those 
ministers. However, the moratorium was only for new application; the exploration was to be 
continued by those companies that had already been granted the exploration permits. The 
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President and the Minister of Mineral Resources supported hydraulic fracturing because of 
potential economic benefits, so the current exploration could continue (du Plessis 2015). 
In June 2015, legislation governing hydraulic fracturing (GN R466) was passed. This legislation 
prescribed “standards and practices for the onshore exploration and production of petroleum 
(including gas, although this is not specified in the draft regulations)” (du Plessis 2015). 
4.4.1.2 National mood- Interest groups’ pressure 
The government intention to go forward with shale gas exploration and exploitation raised 
strong opposition and debates among South Africans and even internationally. Environmental 
activists have raised their concerns on the consequences this process could have on the 
environment. They argued that this process could contaminate the underground water, pollute 
the air and endanger biodiversity. They were also concerned about water disposal 
management. They argued that to prevent negative environmental effects of hydraulic 
fracturing, government needs to develop clear legislation and a statutory system to govern 
hydraulic fracturing processes (Parker 2013). 
Kingdon (2011) argued that social movements may not be the idea of the general public; they 
may be organised by organisations or some leaders who may have influence on the policy and 
such social movements may have considerable influence on the nation’s mood. Kingdon’s 
argument has been evidenced in the case of hydraulic fracturing. In 2011, immediately after the 
Minister of Mineral Resources announced the intention to receive applications for exploration 
rights, strong opposition was experienced. The campaigns were organised by the Treasure the 
Karoo Action Group (TKAG) (Peek et al. 2014). TKAG invested its resources in public campaigns 
which were intended to attract public support for opposing the government decision to 
implement hydraulic fracturing. TKAG invested again in investigating the process and in legal 
interventions (Fig 2012). The national mood was strongly felton social media and by the media 
in general. The members of TKAG were residents of both the Karoo and the large cities. It made 
coalitions with other campaigns and NGOs but it was the main anti-fracking group (Fig 2012). 
Government also faced opposition from farmers. Lukie Strydom and Dougie Stern were farmers 
who received funds from BKB (a former farmers’ co-operative which markets wool and 
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livestock) to visit the United States to do research on hydraulic fracturing. When they came 
back, they were convinced that they do not want their farms to be fracked. They participated in 
lobbying for the support of other farmers to fight the government decision. Stern, an office 
bearer of Agri-Eastern Cape, also organised anti-fracking movements (Burkhardt 2013). 
Different NGOs have worked hard to ensure public participation. The Southern Cape Land 
Committee has organised campaigns educating farmers about the effects of fracking. The 
Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa and the Centre for Environmental Rights have 
offered workshops indifferent Karoo communities. Farmers and the public became the main 
opponents of fracking, arguing that it would not create any employment for local residents; 
rather it would destroy the already existing jobs provided by farms (Fig 2012). 
In August 2014, after President Jacob Zuma’s State of the Nation Address in July 2014, the TKAG 
and AfriForum submitted a letter to the president. This letter was substantiated by scientific 
information that questioned the sustainability of hydraulic fracturing. They demanded another 
moratorium to be passed on hydraulic fracturing (Peek et al. 2014). The pressure from these 
groups resulted in the initiation of anethnographic research project intended to respond to the 
demands of these groups (Merwe 2015). 
4.4.2 Organised political forces 
The 2011 moratorium on hydraulic fracturing was influenced by the public campaign organised 
by the TKAG (Merwe 2015). This reflects Kingdon’s argument that emphasised the potential 
influence ofinterest groups in removing or preventing some issues or alternatives from 
obtaining space on the agenda list. According to Kingdon (2011), interest groups are still 
important in this stream as participants within and around government respond to their 
activities. He however, argued that organised forces may not stop government officials from 
pushing anidea onto the agenda (Kingdon 2011), which was the case with hydraulic fracturing. 
4.4.3 Government in the political stream 
The change in government administration provided an opportunity for advocates of hydraulic 
fracturing. The government interest to address the energy crisis wasnoted when the President 
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Jacob Zuma took over from Thabo Mbeki who had claimed in his State of the Nation Address in 
2008 that the energy problem was not a crisis. 
According to Kingdon (2011), administration can be composed of three actors which are the 
president, executive office, appointed politicians in departments and bureaus answering to the 
president or be any one of these actors. Administration is sometimes more dominant in the 
policy making process. Their decision is generally regarded as important; if they decide a 
problem or an issue deserves to be a priority, many other actors are also likely to consider it a 
priority. Policy advocates with proposals that manage to get the attention of the administration 
are more likely to succeed in including their proposals in the government’s policy agenda list 
(Kingdon 2011). 
Among the three actors in the administration, the President is argued to be the most 
important. The president can set an agenda alone but the executive branch or the congress or 
actors outside government cannot do this without presidential buy-in. The power of the 
administration on agenda setting and on choosing appropriate alternatives, as Kingdon has 
argued, is evident in the case of hydraulic fracturing. The President and other ministers’ support 
for hydraulic fracturing is the reason why it is likely to be implemented, despite the opposition 
of other policy actors. The President and other important administrators have made numerous 
statements in support of hydraulic fracturing as a policy alternative solution for the energy 
crisis in the country. They have pointed to the benefits that it would bring to the country while 
solving the energy crisis. 
4.5The policy window and coupling of the streams 
A policy window is defined by Kingdon (2011) as a chance for policy advocates to put pressure 
on government decision makers to consider their policy solution on the problem they feel 
demands attention. Policy advocates prepare possible solutions and wait for a day when these 
problems become prominent, which is a time when a window opens and grant them the 
opportunity to present their proposals. A window opens when there is a change in a political 
stream. Policy entrepreneurs wait with their prepared proposals at hand for an opening of the 
window which is often unpredictable (Kingdon 2011). 
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In the case of this study, the window opened in 2008 when the energy problem became 
intense, during the period when the country experienced load shedding. This was when the 
energy problem was considered a crisis that demanded attention. Policy entrepreneurs 
advocating for hydraulic fracturing saw the window of opportunity and pushed for their 
proposals. It was discovered decades ago that South Africa had abandoned shale gas which the 
country could benefit from if exploited but during that time nothing was done since the country 
did not have problems that could be solved by exploitation of shale gas. When the country 
began to experience an energy crisis, advocates of hydraulic fracturing, especially companies 
which would benefit from it, saw the opportunity and presented their ideas to government 
decision makers.  
As Kingdon has argued, a window also opens when there is a change in the political stream that 
supports the problem and provides a solution. In the case of this study, a change in the political 
stream was experienced. Important government decision makers like the President and other 
administrators were interested in solving the energy crisis and were in support of hydraulic 
fracturing. They considered hydraulic fracturing as a feasible solution to the energy crisis. 
According to Kingdon, when the three streams are coupled together, it is an appropriate time 
to address the problem and for a policy change. This is applicable in this case: the energy 
problem was recognised, and a suitable policy solution was attached to problem, accompanied 
with a change in the political stream. The window opens when the three streams are coupled 
together. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a discussion on the agenda setting process of hydraulic fracturing in 
South Africa. Kingdon’s three streams (problem, policy and political) were used to analyse the 
agenda setting process of hydraulic fracturing as a policy alternative. Within the problem 
stream, it was discovered that the country was experiencing an energy crisis which called for a 
policy solution. Within the policy stream, different proposals were present which were aimed at 
solving the energy crisis but hydraulic fracturing was considered a feasible solution to the crisis. 
There was also a change in the political stream: the problem was a priority to government 
authorities and they also supported the solution attached to it. However, interest groups and 
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other actors were not in support of hydraulic fracturing but since important administrators 
including the President were supporting it, government officials have been able to push their 
ideas onto the agenda. The coupling of these three streams was experienced in what Kingdon 








CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This research has tried to unpack the agenda settings of hydraulic fracturing as a policy 
alternative to solve the energy problem in South Africa from 2008 to 2015. Guided by Kingdon’s 
three streams of agenda setting, the following questions were answered: How has energy 
production emerged as a policy issue in SA? How has hydraulic fracturing emerged as a policy 
alternative in SA? What is the problem environment regarding hydraulic fracturing in SA? What 
is the political environment regarding hydraulic fracturing in South Africa? What is the potential 
policy development in the area of hydraulic fracturing? 
Kingdon (1995) has argued that for a policy change to be experienced, three streams (problem, 
policy and political) have to be coupled together. He argued for a policy to be developed, a 
problem that needs attention has to be recognised and accompanied by developments in the 
political stream; this implies that a window opens when a problem is recognised and when 
there is a climate change in the policy stream.  Kingdon’s theory of agenda setting is evident in 
the agenda setting process of hydraulic fracturing in South Africa. The three streams, as 
Kingdon has argued, have coupled which is why the government is now in the process of 
implementing hydraulic fracturing in its exploration stage. 
South Africa has experienced some noticeable indicators of energy supply being a problem. 
Eskom has experienced difficulties in supplying the country consistently with energy. The 
demand for energy was too high, especially in 2008 and up until 2015. The energy demand 
started increasing in 1994 when the democratic government led by ANC took over from the 
apartheid regime. The new government introduced an electrification programme thus demand 
has increased while the supply has not. The energy crisis became a concern for many people 
when Eskom introduced load shedding which is the cutting of electricity for a scheduled period 
indifferent places. Load shedding severely affected the economy of South Africa and people’s 
lives. It was estimated to have cost the economy ZAR 50 billion (USD 6.6 billion) during three 
months in 2008 (NERSA cited in Modimoeng 2008; Barker 2015). 
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As Kingdon has argued, a problem may receive attention if it reaches a crisis phase. The 
government and Eskom have been aware of the increase in energy demand for many years but 
nothing was done until load shedding was introduced in2008 when it was considered a crisis 
and its consequences were experienced by everyone. The problem stream was experienced in 
this case as explained by Kingdon; he argued that for a problem to be considered, evidence of 
the magnitude of the problem must be provided. The magnitudes of the energy crisis illustrated 
by the figures indicate the decline in the economy. Kingdon also argued that the way a problem 
or an issue is interpreted is also important for a problem to be placed onto the agenda. The 
energy problem was not a priority when Thabo Mbeki was president of South Africa but his 
successor President Zuma considered it as a crisis that demanded agent attention. 
The government of South Africa had to respond to the energy crisis it was facing. Various 
energy production alternatives to increase the energy supply were considered. The crisis could 
not be solved by one alternative which is why the government considered an energy mix which 
included gas, petroleum, nuclear, hydropower, renewables, coal and other sources. The 
decision to implement this energy mix was influenced by the government intention to move 
away from relying on coal which is also contributing to the climate change. Decision making 
processes on the energy production mix included debates, discussions and public consultations. 
In 2008, policy entrepreneurs (Oil Company) submitted their proposals for implementation of 
hydraulic fracturing. They argued that the exploitation of shale gas could solve the energy crisis 
while contributing to economic development. Other policy entrepreneurs were against the 
implementation of hydraulic fracturing, pointing to the impact it could have on the 
environment and public health. These disagreements contributed to the delay of the 
implementation of hydraulic fracturing as a moratorium had to be passed while investigations 
were being done. Legislation providing for this process also had to be formulated. 
Policy entrepreneurs like anti-fracking groups advocated for renewable sources and nuclear 
power. Their proposals were considered not feasible and did not anticipate future constraints. 
Renewable sources like solar energy are already part of the country’s energy production 
activities but it is argued this could not expanded as it is too costly. The same applies to nuclear 
power. For the country to solve the present energy crisis and avoid future problems, it was 
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argued that hydraulic fracturing had to be implemented as it was predicted that the energy 
demand will continue to increase as the population grows. Advocates of hydraulic fracturing 
argued that if implemented, it would contribute to economic development and create 
employment for South Africans. 
As Kingdon has argued, in a policy stream a number of proposals exist. Policy entrepreneurs 
wait with their proposals ready to be attached to problems. This was the case with hydraulic 
fracturing policy entrepreneurs; they submitted their proposals in 2008 when the problem was 
considered a priority though their proposals for exploration were not granted then. Different 
alternatives were considered regarding the energy mix. However, conflicts within the policy 
community emerged as some policy specialists were against hydraulic fracturing. This has 
reflected Kingdon’s argument that within a community, fragmentation may be experienced 
which is when policy specialists have different paradigms. 
Policy entrepreneurs who advocated for renewable resources to be expanded did not win as 
their proposals were argued to be not feasible and too costly. Kingdon argued that proposals 
are judged by government officials in terms of their political costs and benefits. He argued that 
proposals have to be technically feasible, anticipate future constraints and their costs should 
also be acceptable. Proposals should also be acceptable to the public and specialists which was 
not the case with hydraulic fracturing. Government decision makers are pursuing hydraulic 
fracturing without the support of the public, especially those residing in the Karoo. However, 
Kingdon indicated later in the political stream that public opinion is important in the agenda 
setting process but is not more important than the President’s decision. 
The advocates of hydraulic fracturing (oil companies) have also tried to soften up those actors 
against hydraulic fracturing by providing education, holding community meetings and teaching 
communities about this process and its benefits. Kingdon’s theory can also be applied here. He 
argued that policy advocates work hard to mobilise the public and different actors including the 
policy community that is not supporting policy change. They may do this though providing 
education aimed at changing the public’s thinking and garnering their support. 
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Developments in the political stream were also experienced in the agenda setting process of 
hydraulic fracturing. As Kingdon has described, a change in the national mood was experienced. 
The public was opposing to hydraulic fracturing which of course affected its agenda setting 
process by delaying the process. However, the national mood on the government side was in 
support of hydraulic fracturing. The President and other important administrators showed 
commitment to the development of shale gas which was the reason why the window opened 
despite the pressure from interest groups which were opposing it. The change in the 
government administration also contributed to the opportunity for advocates of hydraulic 
fracturing. The government interest to address the energy crisis was evident when the 
President Jacob Zuma took over from Thabo Mbeki.  
The energy crisis experienced since 2008 served as a window for advocates of hydraulic 
fracturing. The crisis provided the opportunity for them to attach their proposals to the 
problem. The energy crisis was also accompanied by the developments in political stream. The 
convergence of the energy problem, hydraulic fracturing as a policy alternative and change in 
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